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Well, if you work for facebook, ethics is not your priority in the first place.

On the other hand, if I ever decided to throw mine on the toilet and work for a company that manipulate people, and perform mass spying on them, then I would go all the way and just do things like this.


There are plenty of worse companies (direct scams, sketchy loans, ponzi schemes); I’d say going there would be “going all the way”.

There are good things you can do at fb too, e.g. expand the positive areas of FB or work on removing the negatives.


Good things like inciting war and political division? Maybe building tools to easily spread misinformation that drowns out factual information?


You misunderstood. I gave other examples of good things.

To elaborate, I said “work on removing the negatives”. If you won’t work at fb, others will. But when you work there, you actually have the power to change the place so that they do less of the stuff that you described.


I wouldn’t work for Facebook because I don’t hate myself enough. But I also don’t clutch my pearls and think that any for profit company is feeding starving children.

You can make a negative case for any of the large tech company.


> You can make a negative case for any of the large tech company.

Yes you can, but it's a spectrum. Microsoft abusing their monopolistic position to strangle competition and adding adware and spyware in an OS people pay for is ethically and morally bad, but is much less bad than Facebook profiting from and doing nothing to stop an actual active genocide. Facebook is by far the worst, ethically and morally, offender of the big tech companies not actively involved in the military industrial complex.


And just went you think Facebook is the worst, TikTok comes around.


"Der Markt regelt das." (The market will regulate itself.)


> The invisible hand is a metaphor used by the Scottish moral philosopher Adam Smith that describes the unintended greater social impacts brought about by individuals acting in their own self-interests.[1][2] Smith originally mentioned the term in his work Theory of Moral Sentiments in 1759, but it has actually become known from his main work The Wealth of Nations, where the phrase is mentioned only once, in connection with import restrictions.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invisible_hand

(should also help to obtain the historic criticism of it that has materialized since back then)


Can FB even do anything meaningful against "an active genocide"?

It's important to assign some responsibility to those who have/had the ability to prevent it, but it's not clear to me that FB could have prevented it.

In close races like the US presidential election it's plausible that FB was the deciding factor, but places where genocides happen are not known for close races.

And to be clear, it's not like FB couldn't have done a lot more with a lot less money to filter out certain kinds of content, but they intentionally wanted some kind of neutrality, right? And that's probably noble (and the maximally harmless thing) when it comes to - let's say Norwegian politics - but not so great in a lot of other contexts. However engaging in moderation with the intent to prevent social ills is very non-trivial.

To me it looks like they realized they were in a hard place and then basically bailed out from the hard problem and instead went all in on trying to make as much money as they can.


The question is not “how could a social network like Facebook have done any better given small tweaks to content moderation?” It’s “is Facebook fundamentally designed to create these kinds of misinformation bubbles?”

That second question is much more painful to ask if you’re an engineer at a company like this, because it means there’s no changing it from within.


but it's also probably false with a likelihood of at least 99%

Facebook is designed fundamentally to be a social graph, a representation of people's lives, blablabla. the more time people spend representing their lives on FB, the more attached they are to their online persona/profile/connections (and the dopamine rewards through likes and engagement), the more money it makes.

misinformation bubble? who cares. if that is what people want to represent, FB provides it, sure, but it's not what it is designed for.


This is cool, but both safari and firefox will not implement it:

https://usefulangle.com/web-updates/post/80/firefox-decines-...

I assume this is because of security concerns.


Am I alone in thinking even its Chrome implementation is a massive security risk? The fact that users can grant any webpage COMPLETE control of a USB attached device is astonishing. Live webpages shouldn't be able to access this feature - can't wait for fake jailbreak and backup services to start cropping up.


It's an incredibly bad idea, at work for the one Chromium browser we permit (Edge), we have to use policies to block this and several dozen major security vulnerabilities that exist solely because they make cool Google I/O demos.


Why is it a security vulnerability? I really want WebUSB to succeed, it could be a cross platform way to eliminate random executables from shady websites.

The idea is that your browser can mediate and scope access to specific devices. There are some edge cases where Web USB is equally as dangerous as the status quo, but in the common case it is far better and never worse.

The situation today is you buy a random USB gadget (e.g. a fitness tracker), but you can't use it without also installing the accompanying software/drivers. That effectively gives the manufacturer complete control of your computer. All you really wanted was for them to sync your step count, but you have no option but to give them complete remote access to your computer.

With Web USB you can allow vendor.com to access device 1234:5678 only, and revoke that access whenever you like.

Sure, maybe you could be tricked into clicking through all the confirmations and granting https://fakevendor.com access to a device. That could be bad - but no worse (and probably a lot better) than being tricked into downloading and running fakedriver.exe.

(disclaimer: I work for Google, have nothing to do with Chrome)


I explain in a neighboring comment: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=34563795

It's crucially important that Googlers are divorced of the belief a permission popup on the top of the screen is adequate indication of intent/informed consent. People approve these all the time without understanding what it's for.

Installing software is, at minimum, a very distinct action which users are aware of doing. Generally, they install a limited number of applications for specific purposes, whereas they may visit literally thousands of websites a month. Pretending these two things can be interchangeable is silly.

I am not entirely opposed to being able to use a browser as the UI for an activity like this, but it should require a higher bar to activate it for a specific server to talk to a specific device. Even web extension installs remain far too easy to not be maliciously abused widely. (Chrome extensions remain the primary malware I see in the wild.)

EDIT: The HN gods have me rate limited so hopefully you'll see my response here to the below comment:

Installing software is a complex process. It entails navigating to the correct site, locating a download, fishing it out of the downloads bar (many seniors cannot find this, by the way, it absolutely baffles them), opening it, usually acknowledging that you know it's an executable program, and then navigating the install wizard.

A software engineer would reasonably believe simplifying this is a good thing, but as noted, people regularly accept malware into their browser and do not even consciously realize they did it because it involves a single click.

People absolutely get misled into installing bad software, but they always know they actually did it, it's impossible to follow that chain without having some idea you're doing something.

Accepting malware isn't the answer, understanding people is. There is no technical solution for security, because it's a human problem.


Why is installing software a distinct action, but granting device access not?

Malware is a huge ongoing problem, which suggests this distinction doesn't really exist.

I think we have to accept that there is no way to perfectly eliminate social engineering without also locking down legitimate access to devices. There will be some percentage of users who will click through all the warnings and confirmation prompts, just like there is some percentage of users that will run malware. That's bad, but you're letting the perfect be the enemy of the good.

Your argument could also apply to ssh, a small number of users could be socially engineered into sharing their id_rsa. This happens, we often find them checked into github, for example. Does this mean we should go back to telnet? No, for the vast majority of cases ssh is a huge imperfect improvement.

Likewise, in the vast majority of cases, Web USB is a huge imperfect improvement over installing drivers.


So the issue is we are talking about different dimensions of improvement. I concede that WebUSB is better sandboxed than executing a driver installer (likely running as admin or root) in terms of the blast radius. However, WebUSB is catastrophically worse than an installer in terms of the ability of the infection to occur in the first place. Both because of the aforementioned difficulty of user process of software installation, as well as the additional checks the OS and/or third party antivirus does, as opposed to Google's fairly limited abuse detection capabilities (just Safe Browsing in WebUSB's case, I imagine?).

This is a problem I have talked about many times before regarding Google's security outlook. On Project Zero there's a ton of interesting and surely exciting work into novel ways to compromise systems. ...That work has basically no bearing on improving security for the billions of users who will never be targeted in such a niche technical way.

Real world compromise tends to just be social engineering people into doing what Google explicitly permits websites to do. You could remove malicious activity from a billion users right now by simply... deleting the Notifications API from Chrome, which is principally used to spam ads. Because people mash that allow button all the time, every time.

I'd best guess I see ten times the malware in Chrome (either hijacker extensions delivered by the Chrome Web Store, push notifications from random adult websites, or both) than actual installed malicious software on a given Windows machine.

And this is fixable! Google could fix this with WebUSB and make a net positive all around! Likely by redesigning permission granting in the browser to require deeper user intent. But it would require a fundamental change in how Google understands and perceives security (and it'd likely reduce engagement stats for some features, which various teams would fight), and I've been beating this drum for several years and I don't really expect it to change.

(In fact, one specific change I could recommend: I think APIs like WebUSB, as well as the Notifications API and similar, should probably be completely blocked unless you install a PWA. It's not as much process as a Windows software install, but it's a clear gate to allowing a site more ability, and installing and removing apps is a far easier concept to explain to users than navigating the site privacy settings.)


I think I need to see some data to back up your claim that Web USB makes socially engineering "catastrophically worse". Web USB is deployed today for a billion users, and yet attackers still seem to prefer malware or walking victims through installing TeamViewer, correct?

We're not talking about any vulnerability here, this is social engineering. There is no amount of confirmation that can be required or warnings added that a confidence trickster cannot walk you through dismissing. The only solution is to limit what you're allowed to do with your own computer.

That's a really high price to pay.


Ah, but before they got tricked into TeamViewer, they were likely compromised once or twice over by Google: It's likely the link to the scammer's screen came from a Google ad that directed a user to a browser hijacking web extension, all of which has roughly the same level of difficulty as WebUSB. Then after that, a scammer may talk them through the process of downloading a RAT. (Though TeamViewer has not been popular for this in a while because they are responsive to security reports. There are some overseas-based tools which have taken over exclusively in the last few years because the developer doesn't answer their email.)

WebUSB is new, non-standard, of course, and last time I tried it required feature flagging (it's saving grace... at the time). Compromises through extensions are probably more likely for a while, but WebUSB will probably be more exciting for persistence, considering you could flash an entire hardware device with malicious code, that the user has already demonstrated comfort connecting back to their PC.


Do you think you might have argued against the internet when it was being deployed?

It sure opened the door to a lot of scams, and was far from a perfect solution. Yet it does seem to have had a net positive effect. Maybe that can be true of other technologies sometimes :)

Let's leave it there, I don't think there's anything else to add.


It depends on your threat model. “A trusted party ships high-quality drivers” is a good model but bundling it with the browser, where you run all sorts of code from third parties, can be difficult from the perspective of exposed attack surface. I would expect that someone in the position that ‘ocdtrekkie probably blocks installing random third-party drivers on those machines anyways, so now there’s new a way for websites to do funny things to connected devices at best and pwn your computer because the high-quality USB implementation wasn’t that high quality after all. (I’m putting aside the conversation about phishing people into granting those permissions, because that’s a completely different, difficult discussion.) Also,

> disclaimer: I work for Google, have nothing to do with Chrome

…depends on how you’re squinting.


> pwn your computer because the high-quality USB implementation wasn’t that high quality after all.

You have to compare it to the options we have available today, not an implausibly perfect implementation that doesn't exist.

Let's imagine there is some bug that means if I grant access to a device, then more access than intended is actually granted. That sounds bad, but let's compare that to the non-Web USB model, where you have no option but granting unlimited unrestricted access to everything... now it doesn't sound so bad :)

Isn't "if you can find an 0day exploitable bug you can get access to everything" better than "You don't need a bug, because you already have access to everything"?

> …depends on how you’re squinting.

Umm, I know what I work on?


I think we're talking past each other. If the two alternatives are "I need to use a random native USB driver to talk to this" and "I can use WebUSB" then WebUSB is probably better. But in reality a lot of devices actually already have drivers for that class in the OS, or there's a way to write some sort of restricted driver on that platform doesn't require loading things into the kernel. In that case I'm now using a browser where random websites can either trick me into giving them access to my USB devices with a click, or forcefully access them via an exploit on a surface that is generally amenable to such things. Put another way, I see WebUSB as being an attempt at writing userspace USB drivers by doing it in Chrome instead of the OS, and considering the entire point of using Chrome is so people can run code on your device it might be better to actually not put this capability here.

> Umm, I know what I work on?

As do I, and it would probably be more accurate to write "I work for Google, but not on Chrome".


> But in reality a lot of devices actually already have drivers for that class in the OS

Great, then you don't need to install anything or use Web USB, it's a no-op!

Still, until we can get Microsoft to ship every driver for every device, we still need a solution that works today.

> In that case I'm now using a browser where random websites can either trick me into giving them access to my USB devices with a click,

You can already be tricked into granting complete access to your machine with a few clicks, that's malware. It's a huge ongoing problem that can only be solved by limiting the ability to run third party code. That's a really high price to pay.

Sure, you could be socially engineered into granting an attacker access to a USB device. The only solution is to have no way for you to grant access to USB devices. There is no amount of confirmation or warning you couldn't be tricked into dismissing by a social engineer.

You will also need to uninstall Remote Desktop and OpenSSH, because you could also be socially engineered into configuring them to allow access. It's a common scam to trick people into downloading TeamViewer, so we will also need to remove your Administrator access and setup AppLocker with a strict policy.

> or forcefully access them via an exploit on a surface that is generally amenable to such things

That's not how it works. When a vulnerability is described as "arbitrary code execution", that means the code can do anything, not just access functionality that exists in the browser. If you were to use a browser without WebUSB support, an arbitrary code execution exploit would still be able to interact with USB devices.

The only added complexity here is after you've granted access to a device, otherwise the attack surface is entirely tractable.


This is a technical view, not a human-centric view. There is absolutely a level of warnings that will generally work. Not always, but I've found a number of people in the process of being socially engineered trip up on the UAC prompt and become more suspicious, to the point of booting a scammer out of their PC... and calling me. Likely because of the full-screen effect design and the short, but relatively scary language of the prompt.

You've posited effectively that if we cannot stop people from compromising their computer we should not bother to try. Either let them be owned with a trivial popup and a single press, or remove their agency entirely.

However, a better approach to security would be to take responsibility for designs that allow easy compromise, and build systems designed to drastically reduce the likelihood a user compromises their machines.

We can't stop people from finding a shady installer for a driver on a file sharing site hosted in Russia and running it, but we can make 99% of people less likely to do it with good design.


Web USB can realistically improve security for billions of people globally. It will improve security for me and my family, and we're all humans.

Sure, it's not a magic a wand that solves all problems, or makes malware disappear. I wish it did, but the fact that it doesn't is not a good reason to reject it.

It's deployed to billions of people globally, can you show me any evidence at all that there is any Web USB social engineering happening?


https://www.wired.com/story/chrome-yubikey-phishing-webusb/

Immediately after WebUSB shipped in Chrome: "security researchers Markus Vervier and Michele Orrù detailed a method that exploits a new and obscure feature of Google's Chrome browser to potentially bypass the account protections of any victim using the Yubikey Neo".

The fact that fishing (and fingerprinting etc.) isn't reported widely doesn't mean it doesn't happen. After all you trust Chrome to properly implement everything and take care of things. And yet here's an example of a different hardware standard, WebMIDI: https://twitter.com/denschub/status/1582730985778556931 (note the comment: "Chrome still allows web developers to enumerate attached MIDI devices without user consent or even a notification")


The attack here was that if you get tricked into giving a phishing site your password and Web USB access to your U2F key and then you press your U2F key, then the attacker can bypass the 2FA. I highly doubt this ever happened in real life, it was just a proof of concept.

In my opinion, the Chrome team overreacted and blocked all WebUSB access to any U2F/HID device.

Now if you want to update the firmware or configure your key you need to download an .exe and run it instead, which seems unfortunate to me.

If the phisher had said "Your U2F firmware is out of date, please download and run this update to continue", would that have been a vulnerability? That could also bypass 2FA (or anything else, for that matter).


That is a trivial phishing path. In fact, the phishing site could easily justify that process as being required for security! "We need access to your YubiKey to use it to sign you in" seems extremely plausible.


Assuming security is a well implemented "first class citizen" and not an afterthought, yes…


Let's assume it's an absolute trash fire, the latest of all afterthoughts.

That's still better than "just download and run this exe as Administrator".


So because a few bad actors might abuse it, and some users will fall into the traps laid for them, none of us get to use it.

I reject this way of thinking. Letting bad guys dictate how you live your life and how you use your computer just doesn't scale that well.


systems that allow such brazen exploitation cease to exist, so who cares about scalability?


Do they cease to exist because of gatekeepers, criminals, or both?


It should be an opt-in feature behind browser flag or only available for enterprise users IMO.


Security or privacy (thumbprinting)?

To be fair I'm still exploring it, once you choose a USB device when prompted, is that access for the session or longer?


I think it might be session, but the issue is that most users simply accept permission popups, often without consciously recognizing they did. I've cleaned out the notifications permissions on browsers for dozens of people; all of them denied allowing various websites to spam them with notifications.


That article is from 2020…


Nothing has changed. Both Safari and Firefox are against most hardware APIs for reasons of security and privacy.

Sometimes they implement a seemingly innocuous API like WebMIDI, and boom, fingerprinting: https://twitter.com/denschub/status/1582730985778556931?s=20...


It seems to have kept a lot of good things from python, but fixes many quirks:

- slicing with index or with index+length ? Well, both apparently!

- len() is a method

- ranges and slices have the same syntax

- you can use | to avoid the indentation hell that comes with '''

- true, false and none don't have an upper case first letter

- the lambda design allow for multi lines, despite the language being heavily biased toward statements. And it's using "=>".

- circular imports do not cause errors

- explicit export, although i'd prefer it to be opt in

- lua style ffi

- mapping on dict key/values is the simple case

- CYON is quite interesting

- and of course concurrency and perf from the start

But some of them will cause big troubles:

"errors are values and do not propogate up the call stack by default. Users are not forced to handle errors unless the error value is passed to a typed destination."

Yeah, silent errors in bash scripting taught me I really don't want that.

"The shorthand method for calling functions omits parentheses and commas"

The reason I still can't parse Ruby after 15 years.


The shorthand method use case is declarative UI code, an important use case for scripting languages (flutter also changed Dart syntax for this)


As someone in a similar (alrhough less acute) situation, what did the doctor said that gave you hope?


He actually knew about and discussed post-covid and long covid implications.


No OP but similar situation. It's easy to make the difference: I've been in terribly stressfull situations before. I went to live in Mali, started business, got Malaria, lost everything to the war and had to start all over, going back to my country.

It's not the same. Covid got me bad.

But strangely, only after the third dose of vaccine. Right after it in fact, and ever since.

But it's possible we will learn we are coupounding effects on a lot of fronts: stress from the situation, covid itself, unexpected side effects from the vaccine, and maybe something else.

Hard to tell.

But yeah, this is not regular run of off the mill, stress response.


It has.

So many things were fixed in python packaging.

   - "-m" was introduced.
   - Wheel replaced eggs. 
   - Manylinux target now exists. 
   - pypi was scaled uo, a new api
     introduced and 2fa added.
   - setup.py got replaced by
    setup.cfg and now
    pyproject.toml is gaining speed. 
   - the py launcher is a thing. 
   - Import priority changed. 
   - Import lib changed. 
   - Zipapps were added. 
   - Venv ships with python.
   - Pip replaced easy_install, 
     then ensurepip was created. 
   - The new dependancy solver
     was funded. 
   - Distutils has been sunsetted. 
     Setuptools is on its way.
This doesn't include the dozens of third party projects that target improving package that came out in the last 2 decades. Pip-tools by itself has changed the game.

A lot has been done, and the situation is 10 times better than it used to be. It is still bad, but not because nothing was done, simply because there is still a lot to do.

People dont realize the sheer scale of the task, and the inertia that comes with a language as successful and old as python.

You have a language that is 4 years older than java, highly dynamic, yet uses fortran/c/assembly code in very popular lib (scipy/numpy) accross all popular OS, and webassembly and arm, in 32 and 64 bits. People routinely install multiple versions of python on their machine, linux repos freeze the upgrades and split the packages, mac and windows stores ship broken versions, and half the python userbase is composed of people that are not professional coders that can't use a terminal. Of course companies will complain if you change anything that breaks their 5 years old server, and devs will complain if they don't get the last new great feature.

It's a really, really hard problem, dealt by a FOSS community that 10 years ago was still running on mostly volunteers and the budget of a small start up. Of course, just to get heat by comments on social media and no thanks for all the effort, as if you own total strangers your free work, with no flaws on top of that.

Not to mention you can imagine packaging is not the only things the core devs have to work on.


> This doesn't include the dozens of third party projects that target improving package that came out in the last 2 decades.

One would think that two decades of package improvement initiatives should have been a strong enough signal to PSF to prioritize building an official standard solution.


It has. It's just very slow.

A third party can ignore legacy. It can break stuff. It can avoid supporting platform. It can have a big bug and push a fix the day later. It can skip red tapes. It can document after the fact. It can drop features the next year. It can requires pypi dependancies when the stdlib is not sufficient. It can be by a single author that don't have to ask anybody what they think about before creating something. It can skip security issues and focus on practicality.

CPython cannot.

So any change to the packaging story will always take years for the smalles thing.

That's the same for removing the GIL: touching the c api is a huge deal for the scientific and machine learning stack.

That's why requests has never been included in python despite being vendored with pip: you can never update it fast enough once it's in the stdlib.

That's why we don't have node_modules equivalent yet: autoloading code in the current directory would be a big security risk for a language that is included in many os by default so we need a good design.

Don't assume the team is incompetent or deaf. Given what has already been achieved, that would be a total mismatch.


> Don't assume the team is incompetent or deaf. Given what has already been achieved, that would be a total mismatch.

I am not making any such assumptions (and I don't think most sane people are either); people are just unhappy with lack of an officially standard solution given that it was clear quite a while ago that it was needed. I also don't understand the comparison with GIL or C API - changes to them could be a breaking change whereas a fresh officially recommended solution would by definition be a new solution i.e. not a breaking change. It can be introduced and it can go through iterations while people can take their time to migrate from the myriad of third-party packages (or not, if they are happy with what they are using).

What people, who don't want to deal with deciding between or putting their faith in longevity of third-party tools, are looking for is a solution that is official, part of the standard library and is managed by PSF. That way the decision is basically made for them e.g. like it is done in Rust via cargo.


Fresh now solutions is what put us in this situation: distutis2 was fresh, setuptools was fresh, pip was fresh, wheels were fresh... So now you have a lot of complexity that come from having a lot of solutions in parallel that are slow to sunset.

But the dirty secret of python packaging is that most of the problem don't come from packaging, but from boostrapping python. And this is a huge can of worms I didn't even mentioned.

Also, plenty of things require the participations of other communities like debian splitting pip out of the main package or anaconda not being compatible with pip.

All in all, the way you hand wave the problem is typical from the critics that have a very narrow view of the situation.

If it was that easy, it would have been done.


>Don't assume the team is incompetent or deaf. Given what has already been achieved, that would be a total mismatch

To be perfectly clear, I don't think that. I just think its a missed opportunity over the years to better ways of environment and package management. For instance, on the folder auto loading code: make it a feature of only virtual environments. I know python can detect that its in one. Or engage with distros not to build Python to allow this. They already do custom builds with it (its always missing something from a standard Python installation after all).


Node also has madness that Python does not, like support for circular dependencies. I would definitely not point to Node as a positive example like Cargo.


Cargo is the golden standard, but reaching that level is going to take 10 years at least. I'm not kidding, this is what will be needed to solve all the road blocks.

The first thing we need is a whole ne way of installing python, because half of the problems stems from that. That's just a huge endeavor.


Unlike netflix, Disney+ has a good incentive to never become profitable. It pays enormous licensing fees to its parent company. This means the profits flows to there, and they don't pay a cent of taxes.

Now you are going to say, but doesn't "The Walt Disney Company", the parent of Disney+, then pay all the taxes?

No, because this company is located in Delaware, which means it's virtually exempt of taxes as long as it makes only money from activities outside of Delaware. Which is does, since it's only selling IP to other companies, like the entity managing Disney+ which has it's headquarters in California.


That might make it virtually exempt from Delaware taxes, but what about Federal taxes?


They still have to pay it, but skipping on the state taxe an is already a huge break, espacially since no vat is paid in the transfert.


Well, most people in math and science majors can pass an arts and humanities major. The opposite is not necessarily true.

Anecdotally, I can easily engage in talks about literature, politics and art with my friends coming from a biology or physics background. I can hardly do so with my friends with a major in French or Sociology. When we mix them together, the debate is always animated when we talk about philosophy, a specific author or book, and even painting. If we speak about GPT3 or the CERN, suddenly the table is divided in two.


You can have some seriously in-depth discussions in sociology or philosophy as well, that would be hard to follow for someone with just a STEM background. The kind of sociology or philosophy one would discuss without preparation or reading with friends is not really comparable with the academic disciplines. It is just armchair philosophy/sociology.

I have a feeling many technically minded people would struggle to read and write an essay about Heidegger or Habermas. In fact, I doubt most people are even aware of that type of philosophy due to not having actually delved into it very deeply, and yet as outsiders to such fields they feel confident in making claims that those fields are "easier." (And usually there is also an implication that this being "easier" is an indication of those fields being less serious or worthwhile.)


If my non stem sample would be able to engage with armchair science in the same way that the stem sample can engage with armchair philosophy, I would agree with you.

However, it's not the case.

I also find more stem people reading entry level materials in philosophy around me (like Moral letters to Lucilius), that I will find non stem people ready entry level materials in science (like A brief history of time).

The ratio is hugely disproportionate, and while I understand this is all anecdotal, I have a large and very diverse social circle to observe, spanning on wide areas of age, social backgrounds, political preferences, sexual orientation and jobs.


To be fair the JS community is not as picky about his because it lived in a stage of spaghetti code since the beginning.

It's fair to want to mind easing readability in the design of the language. That's one of the things that has made it so popular since its inception.


Sure. From version 1 even.

The one that shared an era with pokemon version 1, on the original black and white gameboy.

Because it was so clear from the beginning, even if emoji didn't exist, cpu had no core, ruby hasn't been invented yet, and people were sharing the source code on floppy disk.


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