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Such tedious derivations used to be a work of poor PhD students who were instrumentalized for such tasks. I envy those who do PhDs in theoretical physics in the age of AI, people can learn so much about their field quicker via chat than reading obstructing papers.

In essence liquid democracy makes votes a transferable currency bringing it fairly close to what money already is. It would be really hard to prevent existence of an exchange rate between money and vote transfer making that a capitalist dream (until markets themselves gets monopolized).

This is the best way to look on this. Furthermore these surveys are susceptible to bias introduced by the varying degrees of participant engagement. One application I could see for such tools is distill some of participant generated proposals that could be rectified in a further surveys or referenda.

Tangentially, does anyone use a stamping device to put dates in their notebook? I am looking for something that sets the date and, preferably, the time automatically so that I have less friction keeping my notebook timestamped.

Isn’t it still possible for the voter to not cast this ballot paper and bring it to the coercer who waits outside? Then the coercer fill this ballot and ask the next voter to cast it and bring back a blank ballot paper?


It seems you mean something simailar to Selene voting system where a tally board is published containing tracker vote pairs. Each voter can decrypt their tracker once the voting phase closes to check the vote and also means to fake the decryption for claiming another other tracker from the tally board as yours.


> This can easily solved be done via letting people forge receipts. Then anyone can forge a vote to give to someone offering to buy them.

This is the literal definition of receipt freeness. It’s hard to ensure that the receipt you receive to verify your vote had not already been forged by the malware.


Then that is a confusing definition since the voter literally had a receipt of their vote that they can verify.

If the receipt you get says you voted for someone you didn't, then that is a clear sign something went wrong.


The definition is fine. It covers paper ballot security requirement where one shall not get any receipt at all.


> It’s difficult to make an E2E-VIV checking app that’s both trustworthy and receipt-free. The best solutions known allow checking only of votes that will be discarded, and casting of votes that haven’t been checked; this is highly counterintuitive for most voters!

Actually, Benaloh's challenge also does not offer receipt freeness. The adversarial strategy in such a model is to outsource the challenger itself in a hash function which decides whether to accept or discard the vote. It may look impractical at first, but one can build an app that could do that efficiently.

It can be said that all existing end-to-end verifiable remote e-voting systems compromise individual verifiability when reconciling it with receipt-freeness by introducing an assumption about the hardware-based protection of voters' secrets. If they leak or are predetermined by a corrupt vendor implementation, the malware on the voter's client can manipulate the vote at submission, and the adversary later fakes verification for the voter by exploiting that knowledge.

Still, I believe it's a solvable problem which needs more attention. Bingo evoting system is almost there, for instance, with verifiably random generated trackers, but needs a voting booth with a Bingo machine taken at home.


> However dumping that much debt all at once would require the sellers to heavily discount a large portion of their bonds, earning them increasingly fewer, and paying in (depreciating) dollars.

I think all investors are now looking at this with this foresight. Being the first to dump seems to be the winning game here.


>I think all investors are now looking at this with this foresight. Being the first to dump seems to be the winning game here.

When you're talking about hundreds of billions of dollars worth of bonds you simply can't move that much in one go. That's an elephant-in-the-bathtub situation where your moves disturb the market because of their size.

Even the first entity to dump would still have to discount a lot of their bonds. Nobody on the bond market is going to make a $200B snap purchase.


That's exactly what will drive the sell-off. Speed is key. Being the last one to sell is going to leave you with the worst of it.


Piracy does not pay taxes ;)


Or make "campaign contributions".


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