As someone who lived directly across the river from the Bohemian Grove for about a decade, I can tell you with certainty that the only thing he was right about is that it exists and its members are wealthy. There's nothing secret about the existence or timing of the gatherings, as they're discussed in the local paper. Jobs are advertised for caterers and cleanup crews. The people hired always return, just like any other summer camp type job.
This is a great point -- where can we find some INDEPENDENT FACT CHECKERS that happen to have the same political bias as me to dispute the above? I'm extremely uncomfortable that people have different opinions here.
It's funny because in practice probably all of us use Wikipedia as essentially gospel when it comes to almanac facts such as historical people's birthdates or survey numbers, ie average rainfall or the region some tree owl lives in.
Precisely because we expect that Wikipedia has sourced this information, such as climate data, from a reliable location - i.e. not made it up for itself.
I don't really have an easy solution. People aren't doing it in bad faith. Do laws prevent archiving for the purpose of referencing? IANAL but it certainly sounds like one of the copyright exemptions.
If so there could be a "wikisource" that fetches sites when referenced and then archives them. This isn't IA, it's a different goal really.
It's a terrible idea to route all your traffic over tor. If you have any expectation of anonymity you'll be disappointed. Since tor does not do any application level filtering, it is easy for exit nodes to track you.
It's a neat idea but has the same problems as network wide tor routers.
Exactly. Good implementations like Whonix take steps to isolate your circuits between different applications and profiles[0].
Further in those cases you're isolating your identities with virtual machines by default, which helps enforce good compartmentalization.
Forcing all traffic into one environment and then over a single circuit means everything you ever access is linked together. The other story on the front of HN is the accused stalker who was caught partly for doing exactly this (would access his real Gmail and then "stalker" Gmail over the same connection)
Whonix also provides a model of enforcing Tor by using an isolated proxy - which doesn't require kernel modules and also allows firewall policies
I'd classify this as a naive approach that sounds like a good idea at first inspection - but the Whonix developers have really thought this through and their Wiki[1] is a tremendous resource that explains why they use the model they do.
This is kind of how i2p does it. Currently i2p has like 6 "reseed servers" which bootstrap you into finding some other peers. Once you are connected to the network you then can contact "floodfill" servers, which are essentially a distributed form of the directory authorities. Floodfills are autonomously chosen routers on the network, and distribute other nodes to whoever asks.
> Do current browsers entirely prevent a connection to untrusted certs when HSTS is set?
Yes. HSTS would not do much to prevent active MiTM. HSTS just tells the browser that it should only connect to the site over HTTPS. It does not mention which certificates are trusted.
It seems like you are hinting towards certificate pinning (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#Certi...). Pinning would prevent rouge CA's from signing bad certificates, but pinning is hard to do on the web. It is mainly used with mobile applications from what I have seen.