This is mostly true, but even if somebody manages to get access to an application runtime there won't be a major data leakage issue using Evervault because all data has been encrypted using a key that our customers don't host.
All plaintext data processing happens on Evervault's infrastructure, so our customers don't have any runtimes that handle sensitive data in plaintext.
We encrypt data at the field level so your infrastructure (including code and database) never handles sensitive data in plaintext. We also help you manage the decryption keys, so rogue developers or data breaches are as close to inconsequential as they can possibly be.
Thanks for the comment — I understand the sentiment, but we invest a lot more effort in trying to persuade security pros and cryptographers through the technical and security features of the product itself.
The people making the decision to use a product like Evervault isn't always a technical/security audience, so it's a tricky balance to navigate. We want both engineers and non-engineers to understand why using Evervault is important, so sometimes we fall short. This feedback is much appreciated though, and we'll definitely keep it in mind next time we do a website revamp (soon!). Thank you!
If I can make a couple of suggestions for winning over that crowd.
1) As OP said, dial back "never" statements, there's no such thing as perfect security :)
2) When I look at a solution like this which essentially requires a lot of trust from customers (if your servers get hacked or your code is insecure, that's going to be a bit hit for your customers), I look for 3rd party validation. Something like a published 3rd party audit from a reputable consultancy, using good named consultants, with a clearly stated scope of work is likely to help allay fears about trusting a third party with a solution like this.
3) Talk some more about the experience of your team. What you're doing is hard to do well, so explaining where your team has experience of doing things like this in the past, will help.
On #2, we have carried out security audits with Cure53[0] and others, which we are happy to share. We also have a root of trust which is provably embedded in the AWS Nitro System[1]
#1 and #3 are great suggestions which we will implement in our next website revamp. Thanks!
> we have carried out security audits with Cure53[0] and others
You need to be shouting about this on your new security summary page :)
It all builds a story of trustworthiness.
It seems like you have quite a lot of info captured in your blog, but the “blog” section is definitely not where I go first when I’m doing a quick scout of a company/service to size them up (from a “can I trust these guys?” perspective).
You're totally right in saying the number of developers who are actively integrating encryption is pretty small as of today. What we're trying to do is improve developer experience to a point where encrypting all sensitive data is a no-brainer. Still early days here, but we're expending a lot of energy to make this happen.
Re: third-party dependency — we think the same way at Evervault. We bring third-party vendors into the mix if we think they can build something better than we could do ourselves, which is why we partnered with AWS on their Nitro Enclaves[0] product. Our root of trust is the AWS Nitro System. For customers who still aren't comfortable with us managing their security posture, we also offer on-prem and in-VPC options.
Really appreciate the plain "how it works" section just below the fold on the homepage. So many security products offer fluffy marketing pages — it's clear what this does from an implementation perspective right away.
Sure! Our model is focused on making sure that data gets encrypted before it hits our customers' infrastructure, so that there's nowhere on the backend where the data exists in plaintext. This isolates developers from misconfiguration and key management.
Yes! You might be thinking of node-secureworker[0]. We've been the maintainers for the last couple of years, but haven't been using it in production (concerns around Intel SGX)
Thanks for commenting! One thing worth clarifying before diving into specifics is that Evervault doesn't store user data. We do store encryption keys, but the model is that our customers store encrypted data but not keys; Evervault stores keys but not encrypted data.
The attacks you mention (correctly) base themselves on the security of the signing key used to sign the E3 binary. The security of this key is obviously extremely important, but is only one part of the attestation process. Nitro Enclaves exposes attestation documents with platform control registers (PCRs). PCR8 is a hash of the key used to sign the binary itself, but there are also 5 others which contain hashes of the specific binary that is being run as well as the in-memory state of the enclave. Combining these together, means that attestation focuses both on deployment integrity (and GitHub Actions is the weakest point here) as well as the code itself. This is why exposing the code that runs inside E3 is a major focus of ours.
Re: KMS policy integrity, having the enclave communicate with IAM with TLS certificate validation is one way of E3 proving to the end user providing keys/data that the enclave key has not been tampered with. It's a messy solution, but cryptographically robust assuming that the AWS Root CA has not been compromised.
No, only "Option 3" cares about security of the signing key.
Other options do not rely on compromising any encryption keys or production servers, they just need a developer's machine being compromised.
You are talking about PCR and hashes, and they are all good, but ultimately, it all ends up as a "Attestation" field in the request to AWS. And then it is evaluated against a policy, like that one: [0]. So what prevents someone from planting a trojan on arcurn's machine, waiting until they log into AWS console, and changing this policy to remove "Condition" block? Once this is done, anyone can fetch AWS keys and decrypt customer data.
And I don't think "TLS certificate validation" is going to help here, as it will be talking to authentic server. Nor checking of PCRs -- because this is done in that "condition" lock which is so easy to remove.
Yep, but the binary running in the enclave has access to both the attestation document (including PCRs) directly from Nitro as well as a mechanism to fetch IAM policies and verify that they are from the genuine IAM server (verify the TLS CA).
Making sure the IAM policy hasn't been tampered is just a case of adding logic to the enclave app to make sure that the IAM policy is configured correctly for that particular enclave (compare PCRs, make sure there's no wildcards, etc.)
All plaintext data processing happens on Evervault's infrastructure, so our customers don't have any runtimes that handle sensitive data in plaintext.