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Recalls don't require consent of the beneficiary.


> It will depend on the consent of the Beneficiary whether to turn back the Funds to the Originator.

SCT Inst Scheme Rulebook § 4.3.2.3 [0].

Of course, if you are talking about fraud, yes: banks may answer positively to a recall, without contacting the beneficiary, when the beneficiary is a fraudster. Indeed, local laws often require that of banks, and therefore the standards define a dedicated protocol for that.

When you break the law, many legal protections no longer apply.

[0]: https://www.europeanpaymentscouncil.eu/sites/default/files/k...


There are many cases where asking the beneficiary is not necessary, fraud is only one of them.

And to clarify, it's not really "fraud", it's "claim by the originator that a fraud occurred". Which is a very different thing, and which matters immensely in practice.


There are three cases. Fraud is one, the two others are banking mistakes. First, when the bank sends the funds twice by accident. Second, when the bank was not meant to send the funds.

In both of those cases, the beneficiary bank is not even required to send the funds back. It can require consent from the beneficiary (which is its client, after all) if it wants.

Yet in both cases, the beneficiary is not even meant to receive the funds.

Fraud works the same way: unless local law requires it, the beneficiary bank is not required to send the funds back, and can rely on beneficiary consent.


The OP obviously has no idea of what actual freedom of speech is.


Try "brew install valgrind", you'll understand.


sounds like a shitty version of OpenTransactions


even shittier?


Bye FF


ugh. altcoins


Why so non-constructive comment?


If it's true it's a nice DoS vector


fwiw this is currently being discussed on the sks mailing list, but the overwhelming opinon seems to be that the current behaviour should stay. https://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/sks-devel/2015-05/msg0...


You can confirm this independently with the key itself and the published prime.


I too can post a public key I have the private key for and a factor? Or intentionally create a weak key?


Yes you can, we just need to find hpa's n value and see whether it is divisible by 231. If it is, the claim is correct.

I found the n value for my own PGP public key before and I can find hpa's too, I just have to remember the right arguments to gpg.


It's: gpg --list-key --with-key-data <id>


    $ gpg --export -a $$KEYID$$ >keyfile.asc   
    $ gpg --list-packets --debug=0x02 keyfile.asc
...but I don't know if the pkey[] values are directly usable, or have some substructure.


you can trivially verify a key was broken if it was, duh, broken


oh, wait a second, it just factored a second one... (and no, it's not the one sharing a prime with the first factored one).

So summed up: 2 known keys factored so far, 2 more waiting to be identified among the running product (should apparently take a week to identify).


> 2 more waiting to be identified among the running product

I don't know anything about this factoring project; does this mean that keys are somehow "tested" in batches, and if the batch comes out "dirty" then you know you can easily factor something in that batch (for some value of "easy")?

EDIT: Ah, nevermind, just figured it out. For those coming after, there's a running product of all public moduli in the tested set; you can test one key against all of them simultaneously. When you find a GCD /= 1, you've found a factor, and you know the key you just tested has it, but there's an older key which has that factor too, and you don't know which one. Presumably you either go and test them one by one or store "snapshots" of the running product to test.


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