Not picking on you but your answer prove the parent comment's point. Your answer is that of someone that googled some answer and went with it. This problem belongs to selection algorithms and quickselect is the common approach.
> Never underestimate developing countries' governments' willingness to absolutely bend their people over to extract tax revenue (and then their corrupt representatives extract bribes on top of it)
being a developing country or not is orthogonal to what you have described. The top developed nations have one or more of these issues.
Man, I am a native Spaniard and even with Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, Bilbao and industrial powerhouses we can't compete with furthern North Italy/Germany/Netherlands in some areas, but I've heard horror stories from Latin America that wouldn't happen in Spain without making the news.
Reading your parent comment and the responses, I feel be missing the point others are trying to make. There's much less technology, components, and material in a headphone compared to laptops. The circuitry in the headphones is closer in complexity to a charger than a laptop.
The cost of something doesn't always correlate with the technology, components, and material. A Hermes bag doesn't even have a single circuit in it compared to headphones and laptops. Yet it costs more.
This is false equivalence. You're describing the luxury market, a vertical that is built on decoupling the raw material cost from the price tag. And in reality it is more nuanced than just raw material as there is a lot of cost in r&d/marketing/operations etc. Nevertheless, products targeted to general consumers are much more sensitive to that deviation.
That doesn't sound accurate. The T in TPM stands for trust, the whole standard is about verifying and establishing trust between entities. The standard is designed with the assumption that anyone can bring in their scope and probe the ports. This is one of several reasons why the standard defines endorsement keys(EK).
Actually, it is completely true. The TPM threat model has historically focused on software-based threats and physical attacks against the TPM chip itself - crucially NOT the communications between the chip and the CPU. In the over 20 year history of discrete TPMs, they are largely completely vulnerable to interposer (MITM) attacks and only within the last few years is it being addressed by vendors. Endorsement keys don’t matter because the TPM still has to trust the PCR commands sent to it by the CPU. An interposer can replace tampered PCR values with trusted values and the TPM would have no idea.
It is correct, the measurement command to the TPM is not encrypted. So with MITM you can record the boot measurements, then reset and replay to any step of the boot process. Secrets locked to particular stages of boot are then exposed.
There is guidance on "Active" attacks [1], which is to set up your TPM secrets so they additionally require a signature from a secret stored securely on the CPU. But that only addresses secret storage, and does nothing about the compromised measurements. I also don't know what would be capable of providing the CPU secret for x86 processors besides... an embedded/firmware TPM.
This is not a special case. Everything you mentioned above can actually be achieved using cli. You can create listeners, configure pipelines, and sinks(granted not ergonomic). Sinks can be HTTP post for example, and sources can be tcp listeners + protocols on top. You can also configure the buffering strategies for each pipeline.
I feel HN comments have been getting hijacked for a long time now by LLM agents. Always so early, very positive, and hard to spot. Some replaced em-dash with --, some replace them with a single dash, some remove them all together. I wonder how much time it is taking from @dang and other moderators helping to maintain this community.
I will start sharing them moving forward. I've had several parent threads deleted in the past(rightfully so) because it turned out I was responding to AI. Thank you for staying on top of this.