My vague and inexperienced read on their description boils down to "we were doing something weird and non-standard as part of our key ceremony because we intended these keys to be exported, and because of that process weirdness we blundered and gave the HSM faulty instructions."
The most likely explanation is that they generated the weak key externally, imported it into the HSM, generated the CSR from it, and finally had Root CA sign it.
A FIPS HSM does not forbid one to import keys into it.
But shouldn't such a HSM support key attestation (and the parent require such attestation)? Attestation would also track whether a key was imported or generated on the HSM, and of sufficient length.
Attestation is not required by the compliance standard for browser CAs (WebTrust) and it is also quite vendor-specific and not very interoperable, so it is not commonly done.
The Root CA must sign requests after authentication, but a "manual" approval is also accepted if done with the appropriate oversight with witnesses (clearly not the case here).
Of course it's not required, as we see here. The question is why not? Getting a simple code-signing cert seems to have more stringent requirements in that it either requires attestation or CA-issued hardware.
There are so many known systemd-resolved bugs [1][2] that I can't tell which one was breaking both of my simple Ubuntu desktop machines. Systemd-resolved sets itself up as the sole DNS resolver and then randomly reports it can't reach any DNS servers.
Yes and... the tools are now highly distro-specific. I don't want to allocate my study time to resolvectl, I want to allocate it to programming, but my home server requires me to be a beginner again in something that was easy a decade ago. And I am not getting anything of value for that trade.
I use tailscale's DNS feature and run my own DNS server. That way I can have a subset of my services available on the internet via CF tunnels and when I connect to tailscale I get all of them directly, and I can use the same domain names
> The hardware used for each of the issuers is in the attached file. These HSMs are FIPS 140-2 Level 3 compliant.