The problem is that ironworking doesn't actually precede the bronze age collapse archeologically. Ironworking has mysterious and archaic origins... but it doesn't proliferate untill all those empires are fallen and forgotten.
So... He's saying ironworking caused the collapse, or prevented recovery. age
That is interesting, but it requires evidence of sudden wide scale production in the 12th century or earlier.
The conventional take is that ironworking developed gradually because tin/bronze became unavailable. The know evidence of iron working is gradual. Rare pockets gradually becoming more common over centuries. ities, states and empires actually come back as ironworking grown. Slag and reurbanization track one another.
Also interesting that Egypt survived and did not do "iron age." They were sitting on vast hordes of tin and bronze. Bronze can be remolded. They were also less trade dependent. Egypt exported gold, grain & textiles. They imported tin, copper and slaves.
Personally, I suspect that it could have been "financial crisis." Debt cycles and their consequences appear heavily in late bronze age sources. The Ugarit archive. The armana letters etc.
Earlier scholars took this theory too far in the 60s and forced it into ideological moulds.
But... I find it hard to ignore direct* accounts of people in that time. People were becoming endebted, debt bonded... and growing hordes of "outlaws" form to eacape. These institutions were apparently international. There are international treaties dealing with them.
I also don't discount "axial age" hypothesese. A "death of god" paradigm, perhaps related to Zoroaster (elam), akhenatan (Egypt), etc.
He's absolutely not saying iron caused the collapse, only that it prevented the recovery.
> The causes of the Bronze Age collapse are still debated by historians: a series of severe droughts; the sudden appearance of mysterious Sea Peoples, who raided along the Mediterranean coast; the disruption of the tin trade routes; internal revolts; or possibly all of these at once. But there is another unifying factor that could have prevented the resurgence of empires: iron.
There would be a tipping point though. Where mining the ingredients for bronze would become economically nonviable- after that the mining infrastructure collapses hard and fast. And with it the mining towns would empty out and the still bronze relying cultures would destabilize in waves of "cheap" bronze, expensive ingredients.
The mining infrastructure didn't collapse. But tin was traded over very large distances,mostly from outside of that civilization's brotherhood of great kings (the rabbu surru system).
Iron bloomeries (via slag finds) appear in the record sporadically. It starts before the collapse, and may have very archaic uknown origins. But... they become common as recovery happens.
So... Causation seems to be backwards. Bronze production mostly ends. Iron working starts gradually expanding in the absence of bronze.
Also... The "superior weapons" angle isn't very strong. Bronze and early iron were not in a different league.
Iron just has more potential for scale, because the material itself is abundant. It requires a lot of labour and fuel, but if you can scale those you can scale ironworking. Eventually iron surpasses bronze and steel is vastly superior... but this takes many centuries.
I learned a little bit about georgism as the idea started crossing my feed.. 5-ish years ago.
What I've noticed, especially in online spaces is that advocates have quite disperate notions of what it's supposed to do and how it's supposed to work.
Relatively contentious and complex arguments about 2nd and 3rd order effects seem to dominate. EG rent will decrease because of incentives and political economies.
I think this comes from defensive arguments.
Here, he defends against the argument thelat taxes will be passed on to tenents. I agree that the answer is no, but how that is established is important. It's core to understanding the whole framework.
The premise of georgism is that land is scarce. Hi demand, and low supply yields a price. That price does not change because the landlord owes taxes. Supply and demand remain the same, and yields the same price/rent.
LVT is the maximum, non distorting tax rate. The rate at which land itself is worth zero. If tax exceeds LVT building becomes unprofitable and land has negative value.
When tax equals lvt... Tax revenue is maximized and land value is zero.... in the theoretical chalkboard economy.
This is the whole core reasoning underlying Georgism. It is about capturing the value of land, in taxes. All of it, ideally.
Price, scarcity, abundance, affordability... These are peripheral. Also the same rules, more or less apply.
Skipping onto YIMBY, supply constraints and whatnot tends to obfuscate the key parts.
Georgism wants to crash the property market. Zero out the location component of real estate value.
If I actually instituted, an enormous class of wealth goes poof.
Georgism does not assume that land is scarce, Georgism only assumes that land is in constant supply. E.g. that taxing land does not cause the land to disappear, unlike produced goods, where if you tax a shirt, for example, you get less shirts produced. That's the whole point. Because fewer shirts are produced, the price of each shirt goes up, and this is the mechanism by which taxes can be "passed on" to the buyers of shirts.
On the other hand, structures on the land are produced, they are not in fixed supply. Therefore Georgism does not advocate taxing the structure -- only the land itself.
Because land is in fixed supply, it is impossible to pass on costs to renters of land. In a market economy where prices are set by supply and demand, the only mechanism for sellers to pass on costs is a reduction in supply (since they cannot influence demand), because for all goods (not just land), the sellers always charge the maximum the market can bear. Once this price is established, they cannot "choose" to raise prices, because this suggests they were charging less than the market would bear before. Therefore threats to raise prices even more are always hollow. Landlords are not charities, they always charge the maximum that renters can pay, irrespective of the landlords' own costs.
In that environment, the only way for land rent prices to go up higher is a reduction in supply, as demand curves bend downward. But with land, supply is fixed so reductions in supply are impossible. This is the insight of Ricardo.
Now the argument is that land, encumbered with a tax, is worth less to the land buyer than unencumbered land, so that what happens as property taxes rise is that the land falls in value due to the tax burden. It never falls to zero, of course, even at a one million percent tax rate the land has some positive value, if even just a few pennies -- at which it will be sold, and so the result is the capture of the value of the land by the state, while people get to keep the value of what they produce (the structure on the land), which is not taxed. It's important to recognize that not taxing produced goods is an important part of Georgism also. This incentivizes people to invest in produced goods rather than non-produced goods, and to save by acquiring capital rather than land, as there is no social benefit for people to bid against each other for ownership of something in fixed supply like land, because no matter how many bidders there are, the same amount of land will be supplied every year, regardless of what price it is.
> Landlords are not charities, they always charge the maximum that renters can pay, irrespective of the landlords' own costs.
This is simply not true in the same way that consumers are not always rational and always pay the exact correct price.
Landlords regularly charge less than full market rate, for example when they have a good tenant, as the costs of a new tenancy and the risk of a void are higher than the incremental marginal rent (once taxed at the landlord's marginal rate) is worth to that landlord. Unlike what most people seem to assume, being a landlord is not a zero-labour job. Things that require additional labour on the part of the landlord have to be worth it.
The thing that changes this calculation is an increase in costs. You are right that landlords are not charities, so they will generally avoid a loss. The primary costs for most landlords are mortgage interest and taxes. Increase the taxes and some of these landlords will now be underwater and will increase prices towards highest market rate as a result.
Yes, landlords have and rental markets are not securatized commodity markets. There's always some noise.
The point is that the price is determined by supply and demand, primarily. Speculative market responses at the margins if the transition is analyzing the noise. Besides the point.
The much bigger issue at transition, is that landlords are going to be underwater across the board. The whole point here is a permanent transition from high land prices to near-zero land prices.
Landlords avoid raising prices to good tenants not for emotional reasons, but because a vacant apartment earns no rent, and getting a tenant that lives in the unit only for 6 months and then you need to spend two months without rent looking for a new tenant is a worse situation in terms of revenue than a stable tenant that pays every month. It is purely an economic decision that takes search costs into account and falls into the rubric "charging the most the market can bear".
You are just adding complications but not really changing the argument. We can also talk about hotels versus longer term rentals versus residential rent. Why does a hotel charge more per night than a residential rental? Because hotels have much higher vacancy rates, in order to have a unit available. A good hotel strives to be 3/4 full at any time. That would bankrupt most landlords of residential housing, where vacancy rates are 5-7%, not 20-30%.
As the rent goes up above the average rent for your area, so does the cost and time of finding someone willing to pay that rent, and in this way, there is an optimal rent that maximizes your revenue that may not be the highest rent paid but is the highest revenue received over time. That is why good, stable tenants often pay less.
Yes, said more directly, tenants are not commodities. Some tenants will destroy their unit. Others will require more maintenance requests, move out sooner or will pay rents later. Those differing qualities yield different prices. They have differing qualities, just as items at the grocery store do. You will pay more for a higher quality item, if you desire that quality.
Thus there is no single rental price, merely an initial unknown quality rental price, that as a tenant gets to know the quality of the landlord, and the landlord gets to know the tenant, will resolve to a price that is different for every combination. There will be a distribution according to all of these factors.
Henry George talks about "fixed supply" and a lot of his language speaks to the conomic ideas of the time. Remember that the liberal philosophy of property rights was all about adding your own labour to establish value and property rights.
But... We've moved on from those things.
We both said the same thing, just using different words. But... Using simple, modern economic explanations makes it a lot easier to follow.
I think people get totally lost unless they understand (in modern, marginalist microeconomic terms) why (a) rent does not change (b) the value of land becomes near-zero (c) what "land value" attempts to describe.
Meanwhile, the part of this that inevitably dominates the politics and decision making is this: (x) land loses all it's value and real estate investing no longer yields capital gains (y) Homeownership is no longer a safe haven. Owner-occupiers becomes exposed to future housing costs, just like renters.
These are two major changes, and Georgism and needs to own them (imo) to maintain coherence. There's no room for confusion here.
>It never falls to zero, of course, even at a one million percent tax rate the land has some positive value
No. The land can have negative value, if the tax is too high. This is the kind of confusion I'm talking about... and where georgism gets genuinely confusing.
The "land value" in Geogist land-value-tax.. is not market price. It is whatever the land price would be.. in a market without property taxes. It is a theoretical price. The tax rate is applied to the theoretical price. That is LVT.
The whole business with theoretical prices is why Georgism was dismissed as a form of communism. Soviet economics was developing similar concepts in the 60s-90s. Eg linear programming.
In all honesty, I don't think this is all that important. Irl georgist policies would have to make do with an innacurate estimate of LVT, erring on the side of low taxe rates relative to "real/theoretical" LVT. They could even abandon the concept entirely, and go with a more tangible proxy.
But... long before you get to that point, you have to contend with the losers of this paradigm shift. (1) Anyone holding valuable real estate loses. Both homeowners and investors. That is a lot of private wealth disappearing (2)Then, the economic safety of home ownership disappears. You can no longer buy to lock in a price and guarantee yourself housing forever.
It's important to remember that in most periods, Georgists like georgism because it is a better tax system. It's not really a solution to housing availability or affordability... not directly.
There are interesting discussions to be had about indirect consequences.. but you can only have those once you have the direct consequences straight.
There are real, genuine tradeoffs. Policy advocacy tends to obfuscate these... and that balloons out into a general confusion.
Product, technology, implementation, police department, policing method, workflow. These aren't discreet. Incidents involve all of them.
Responsibility is on people.Technologies cannot be "found guilty." But... this isnt' a trial. There are consequences to doing policing any particular way, and that's the subject.
Doing it this way... using baby skynet for command and control has advantages, like response time. It has disadvantages, like false positives. "Law enforcement error" is technically correct, but not informative about the matter at hand. The error
That is, the www was "being killed" already in a lot of ways. "Democratization" and suchlike open ideals had already been receding for a long time.
In part, this is because of "democratization" of access. The old web was a self selected, subpopulation. After smartphones, it is the whole population.
Facebook's walled garden and other apps using the web as "merely infrastructure." Algorithic recommendations replace hyperlinks, until it no longer "a web."
Google, imo, represents a sort of intermediate stage. "Pagerank" the original tech behind their search relied on the hyperlink web structure... and also degraded it.
That was SEO paradigm. Now there is the LLM equivalent of SEO.
So... LLMs eat the web, while also making it redundant. The previous paradigm and all it's contents whill exist as a ghost within the new one.
I always hated the term "democratization" because last I checked there was never any consensus on what should be done, always MBA pricks shoving whatever they wanted down our throats.
If the timeline of things as you present them is taken as accurate, then I would say the www being killed was good, with FB opening up to everyone being the inflection point toward bad.
Webrings are nostalgic, but the old web sucked, and there was a dearth of information and fun to be had. I remember getting online and being able to confirm "nope, no new anime content worth looking at today" by quickly checking Usenet and Yahoo's index (which was updated manually) and a few webrings.
now, I'm able to watch a show that aired in Brazil the day after, with English subtitles.
People who long for the web of the 90s, I always feel like they must not be very interesting. Imagine complaining that we can't go back to libraries of the 1970s when the ones today have 3D printers, DVDs to rent, etc. because "there are too many teenagers"
If you judge the internet and the world by "no new anime content today" things have actually improved. But some would think that's not a healthy way to see things.
> People who long for the web of the 90s, I always feel like they must not be very interesting.
That's confusing content access with monopolised algorithmic promotion/curation of belief systems, using selected news and opinion pieces to modify beliefs and behaviour.
It's nice you can view (pirate) whatever content you want, but not so nice that algorithmic platforms pretend to be neutral social spaces when in fact they're being used to promote certain political and cultural beliefs while suppressing others.
I don't know about anyone else, but anybody who goes into a "1970s library" (I don't know what that is, but I guess it means a good old-fashioned library with like, books) and complains about the lack of 3D printers or that their obscure animated series catalog isn't wide enough would embody the definition of an uninteresting person to me.
I am one of the people that long for the old internet. I don’t long for it because there are too many normal people on it now.
The old internet was interesting, open, simple, un-gated, and relatively egalitarian with few corporate interests in commanding positions. The new internet is basically a predatory environment disguised as a library.
> People who long for the web of the 90s, I always feel like they must not be very interesting. Imagine complaining that we can't go back to libraries of the 1970s when the ones today have 3D printers, DVDs to rent, etc. because "there are too many teenagers"
The Internet used to be a space for high-IQ people, and now it's filled with low attention span, low impulse control people. Tik Tok and Instagram are the worst offenders in this regard, because it enabled borderline illiterate people to communicate on the Internet.
A quick read of any old usenet arguments should instantly disabuse you of this absurd notion. Or the old archives of stupid IRC conversations.
The old internet was a space for people who were incentivized to spend significant effort dealing with technical things to connect to strangers, which has nothing to do with IQ or "intelligence" or anything like that.
There has always been plenty of people who are extremely stupid, but have no problem following technical minutia as required for things like the early internet.
Remember that early access was extremely expensive. Usually it was billed hourly, at significant rates. This means that the primary filter for internet users back then was connection to resources, through an academic connection, a corporate connection, a government connection, or a lot of personal wealth.
The quality of internet users early on, if it even existed (which I dispute), was more driven by organizations like the government, academia, and defense contractors.
And as much as people cried about "Eternal September", the internet mostly survived as a distributed place with real communities until the late 2000s, where it started to be really profitable to build walled gardens for Advertising economies.
The walls didn't really come up until the 2010s: Facebook being a dominant platform, Google owning Youtube and leveraging that to try and force their own social network, Apple controlling most phones, old forums dying, and the rise of AWS to centralize internet software design.
Being able to deal with “technical minutiae” is highly linked to intelligence. What you’re referring to is lacking social graces, which is different than lacking intelligence. Having a hobby that involved reasoning about abstract things like IRQ assignments is a pretty good proxy for IQ.
Similarly, back when computers were expensive, people on the internet generally were higher income, which is also quite significantly correlated with intelligence.
I think we still have many high-IQ people on the web. Its just they are not making tiktoks. However, they are harder to find since the pool got bigger.
The ease of use introduced the average individuals to the web and online gaming. When I was younger and online gaming was gaining traction my "clan" hosted servers. This is how I started dipping my toes into programming and server configuration. Literally, everyone that was in the clan was quite intelligent. We had debates and discussions on IRC, forums and teamspeak.
Now, gaming and the web is just trash full of brain rotted individuals. Communities have been destroyed by lack of self hosted or self owned servers. Forums have been destroyed by discord. Games are being destroyed by microtransactions.
The idea of designing incentives far less useful social scientists and policy wonks we're hoping circa 2010.
I agree with and enjoy the overall sentiment of this piece. Incentive are fit losers. BYO incentives is the way to go.
That said, IRL, the structural advantage of external incentives... especially artificially designed ones... Can be near impossible to overcome.
Let's say you are a researcher working in one of the fields tested by 21st century mushiness. Replication failures. P-hacking. An unstructured stream of published research adding up to noise.
This outcome is not just because of publish-or-perish, or other incentive structure. It's also because the field is just hard. Harder than it seems it should be, intuitively.
It seems like science should have uncovered a decent, workable "theory of nutrition" or a promising pathway to one. It hasn't. That means thousands of researchers are working in their little corners... And when they look up from their desk there is no big picture forming. No big project that they are contributing to.
Maybe we just need a new theory, when you research methods.. or something. But... we don't know what that is.
Intrinsic motivation vs academic grind... Facing a near impossible challenge. A good chance of modest success within the pigeon-incetives paradigm... Vs near-guaranteed failure of an alternative, intrinsic motivation path.
Even if you take the intrinsic motivation path... There will probably come a point where you have invested years, achieve nothing... and proudly refusing to publish banal papers like everyone else will seem like folley. This person probably just leaves the field.
Startups are different than the corporations they become. 19th century science is different to modern academia. Trying to replicate qualities is always sysephean.
When "ai slop" became a concept, it mostly came into spaces where "human slop" had already been firmly established.
Obvious ones like content scroll fodder. But also, there's slop everywhere. Even things like longform journalism or trade publications... these are often "slop." A string of platitudes and generalizations that superficially seem serious.
That is true in work culture too. A lot of people jump in on emails, superficially seem to be working... but contribute little of value. Now they do this, but with ai.
Alexander had an iron sword. Julius had an iron sword.
The problem with iron is that it is very hard to make. Requires lots of fuel, labour and technology.
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