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If that's really what it is, Google should put their money where their mouth is. I'd be ok with this change if you had to go through all the same hoops to install apps through the Play store.


Especially since all the malware I had to deal with on relative's phone came directly from Google's Playstore.


That contraption used to press the power button is the SwitchBot Bot[1], made by SwitchBot. That makes this one a "Switch SwitchBot Bot".

https://www.switch-bot.com/products/switchbot-bot


At first I was like what a silly contraption, and now i just appreciate how straight-forward the solution is. I ended up wiring components onto relays to do power management on a past project and using a pi to control it, but in hindsight I was over thinking it. This would have solved my problem a hell of a lot more safely than what I did.


Or maybe a Switch SwitchBot Bot switch?


I would call it a Switch switch SwitchBot Bot.


I put a reply to this article in the comment section of "Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them."

https://nonfunctional.substack.com/p/passkeys-are-a-trap-do-...


Note that YubiKeys are not passkeys. But they are a great alternative to passkeys that are just as secure if not moreso.


Be that as it may, they can still roll out the passkey attestation requirement gradually, -- "flip the switch" just a few thousand users at a time -- so that at no one point in time is there a large blip in users. Truth be told, tech platforms don't even really need to measure what portion of users' devices support remote attestation, since the overwhelming majority of devices will support it. They just need to know that users are passkey-capable in the first place; once enough users have passkeys in any form, they can start requiring remote attestation.

As for the browser permission prompt: Firefox simply warns you that the site is "requesting extended information about your security key [sic] which may affect your privacy." [1] It does not make it at all clear to the user that what's really happening is that the website is gating acces behind a specific approved software stack. If I use a non-widely-used OS or device, what website is going to approve its attestation credentials?

[1] https://github.com/mozilla-firefox/firefox/blob/8e9ac3e12bba...


If you also support TOTP and physical security keys as an alternative to passkeys, that should be enough to provide a stable long-term alternative for users of FOSS devices. And of course, RP-side you can choose to never require the remote attestation flag to be set.

Convenience is precisely the thing that big tech established tech platforms want to reward their users with to keep them around. The undeniable convenience of passkeys didn't have to come with a standard that is threatening against unattestable devices like my Linux phone. But it does, and that means passkeys are a way that the industry can discourage people away from using non-Google/Apple/Microsoft-approved devices.


Supporting physical security keys and passkeys is basically the same thing. It's the same APIs and standard (Webauthn). Most of the nonsense like attestation is partly left over from physical security keys but unnecessary and finally optional for passkeys. That's the irony of all this: passkeys were the attempt at "weakening" physical security key requirements for general use consumer things. They stay around for enterprises that still desire requiring specific physical keys. The complicated standards for the huge variety in key types and the relying party having any metadata on which key type was used is a relic of decades of backwards compatibility with physical security keys. Passkeys come with a standard that threatens against unattestable devices because it was built on a standard for attestable physical security keys. Not as much the other way around.

(Apple didn't join the FIDO Alliance on Passkeys until they made sure attestation was an optional feature and no longer a requirement, for consumer privacy reasons.)


Passkeys work on every Linux device I've used. Maybe the BSDs are missing support but there aren't any FOSS issues here.

This panic about "but what if attestation" goes for any standard that people on open source platforms use. What if browsers add attestation? You're only one update away from losing your freedom! Browsers are a conspiracy by big tech! Apple already built remote attestation into Safari under the Private Access Token system, after all.

There is no intent to kill FOSS, not even from Microsoft anymore. The reality is much worse: nobody really cares about FOSS, except for the parts that make money. No big tech CEO is wringing their hands thinking of ways to end freedom once and for all. They just don't care if whatever they do doesn't work on Linux.

Companies like Disney are happy to block any Linux computer already with the standards we have. Not because they hate freedom, but because they don't care their DRM doesn't work.

Attested passkeys, on the other hand, are a massive pain. You'd need to get a list of all the keys for all the normal trusted parties (Google/Microsoft, Apple doesn't even support it, Yubikey, and so on) and keep that list up to date. The moment a model of Yubikey gets a firmware bug published, all keys signed by all Yubikeys of that firmware need to be retracted (and all users locked out) or attestation is meaningless. They're way too much work outside of the space they're actually useful: managed hardware for employees, where the user has already given up any control anyway.

TOTP is not an alternative for passkeys. It's trivial to phish and it does get phished all the time. The only comparable authentication mechanism is client certificates/mTLS, which has been tried and dismissed long ago.


The intended audience is people who are not yet using passkeys, or have just started (due to all the websites demanding them now) but don't really know what they are.

I apologize that the headline is provocative. I thought for a long time about how to appeal to both people who are barely aware of what passkeys are but also not put off people who like them. I considered calling them a "Trojan Horse" in the headline as I do in the body (i.e. legitimately lovely, but with a terrible and unobvious problem) but "trojan" has another connotation in computer security.

Nonetheless, I said what I meant. Convenience is how they get you. This convenience didn't have to come with a trap, but thanks to the way it was designed, it does.


Sure, I think your logic makes sense, and I don’t want to overemphasize complaints about headlines.

Regarding how I feel about passkeys after reading your article, logically I am reading what you wrote and conceptually understand the trap, it’s just hard to wrap my head around what kind of situation would cause this trap to “catch” me so to speak.

I.e., the upside is real and immediate, the downside is theoretical and tied to future uncertainty.


You're right, I didn't explain in much detail the motivation that will push websites to start requiring the remote attestation flag to be set. I will try to cover that in a future article.

But as for how it could "catch" you: if you use FOSS devices that are unattestable (as is the case for the LineageOS phone and Linux laptop I exclusively use), you may one day find you can't use many websites.


You know what’s a great way to get me to not read something? Shitting on it immediately and making it seem like the articles just going to be another pointless rant.

The title put me off completely.

I’m tired of people shitting on everything. Especially without offering any advice on how to improve things. It’s exhausting to read. And apparently it’s not even the point of the article. So why is it the title?

Very very strange choice.


I really can't comprehend what the actual issue is here. The title isn't "shitting" on anything, it doesn't say "If you use passkeys, you are a horrible person". It literally is a summary of the article's point - Passkeys are a trap. It even offers a solution you long for - Do not use them, a perfectly fine recourse on an individual level unless you expect OP to overpower a massive tech alliance.

The tone hair-splitting makes it seem like you weren't going to be that receptive to the point anyway, no matter how many layers of subtext are inserted to abstract away the actual point, that being - Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them.


>Especially without offering any advice on how to improve things. >And apparently it’s not even the point of the article.

It wasn't a pointless rant, you're seemingly primed for something that didn't happen here.

It's a good argument that passkeys are a trap while TOTPs offer the security you need but avoid the absolute control passkeys may hand over, so stick with those.


TOTP/SMS 2FA is a gigantic pain, I've probably lost multiple 24 hour days worth of time added up from entering TOTP and SMS 2FA codes dozens of times per day on websites that mandate it despite having nothing meaningful worth securing.

With passkeys I click once and I'm in like the golden age of using the web with a password manager in 2012. It's a huge quality of life improvement. If people want to avoid passkeys for whatever reason, that's fine but not interested in reading the same slippery slope argument that gets reposted every week.

A recurring issue with these critiques is how they seemingly presuppose passkeys are an all or nothing thing, and losing your passkey means losing access entirely. Which isn't how it works basically anywhere. It's just another auth method, if you can't use a passkey you fall back to whatever recovery method is offered. If passkeys became some user hostile trap overnight I'd just unenroll them and use TOTP, SMS 2FA, email 2FA, or whatever else is supported.


So true.

And every critic always attacks this same thing. TOTP isn’t so bad, my password manager can do it. 2FA is fine it’s automatically pulled from my phone.

It’s still phishable. The password is still sent. You haven’t solved anything, you just piled more complexity on top to make it harder. People can still use the same password at 12 websites.

Passkeys never get transmitted. If you hack into a server and steal my credentials, all you get is a public key. You can’t use it at another website. A bad developer can store my password or TOTP secret in a way that makes it useful to a thief. That’s not possible with Passkeys.

No one ever offers an alternative other than saying it’s irrelevant. Despite practical experience showing otherwise.

Passkeys work and make my life better. These constant rants remind me of seeing people argue that the GUIs are a waste of time and no one will ever use them and it’s a fad that will go away and the only reason everyone’s talking about them is companies want to sell graphics cards and mice.


>Passkeys work and make my life better.

Not the concern, it's whether it's worth the time and energy to expand passkeys as the default and getting normies using them. Some people will always surrender and say they have nothing to hide, so be it. I'm more thinking about the practical rough edges that user bases will cut themselves on once you expand past the extremely-online.

From my experience, it's a nonstarter. The expectation that normies will understand and maintain a password manager layer to store their digital keys in and understand that concepts end such as sharing passwords or logging in on a new device without fully bootstrapping the password manager is just too far.

I think sometime after Q-Day when the dust settles and we've had to reissue all the keys today, we'll have a better answer on whether the specter of remote attestation is truly manifesting and in any event I bet there'll probably be an updated passkey concept by then.


Passkeys work because you always have the hardware for them.

Suppose I had only passkeys and Google Pay. I take a train into town and lose my phone. What then? I'm screwed.

I couldn't just go home because I'd need to buy a ticket or taxi using my phone. I couldn't buy a replacement phone. I wouldn't be able to online shop on a library computer or withdraw money unless I have a physical bank branch. (I do not.) I can't even contact anyone unless I know their number and borrow a phone or find a way to send an email.

My preferred balance of risk vs convenience is: passwords in a password manager, hardware-based 2FA only for making account changes, and confirmation emails (My email password is not in my password vault.) any time a site successfully or unsuccessfully processes a login attempt.

There is no hardware element. If someone phishes my password, I'll know right away from the login email, unless they're so talented or lucky that they also accessed my email or found a way to spoof my 2FA. If I lose my phone, I'm not totally helpless. I don't see an overall downside to my strategy that isn't worse than passkeys.

-----

Edit: One suggested alternative I can fathom is "passkeys managed by password manager". While this does provide better security than "passwords managed in a password manager", my experience has been that passkeys are not well-implemented across all platforms where they Just Work(TM) on every site. I don't know how you'd go about using passkeys in a shared public computer setting (university lab or library) unless you can install browser extensions (and why would you want to, even if you could?). At the end of the day, these passkeys are still secured by the password manager's single master password. Regardless of what I use, I want emails when a login attempt succeeds or fails. It takes one full second to swipe away at my convenience, and I would instantly become alert to an attempt or login I didn't execute.


My understanding is that TOTP and physical security keys both share very little information about you. Perhaps passkeys, being part of a standard that the FIDO Alliance keeps updating, may some day be expected to reveal considerably more information. And the limited number of remote-attestation-approved passkey managers might someday all start start volunteering such information regardless.


For starters, AAGUID already reveals the passkey provider. It can be spoofed without attestation, but good faith (debatable choice of phrase obviously) users already reveal more about themselves, a fair bit more depending on who you ask and how unusual the choice of passkey provider is.


I completely agree that KeePassXC and other password managers give you total user control, and they do support "passkeys" -- but crucially, not all kinds of passkeys. KeePassXC has no remote attestation support, nor hardware-backing support, and nor do I think it should.

My claim is not that passkeys couldn't give you control in principle. It's that the standard readily allows for websites to prevent you from being allowed to exercise that control, and the unclear messaging and UX around passkeys means most users will not even notice should this happen.


That has nothing to do with the standard. Any website can invent its own proprietary authentication extension and try to force it on its users. If a website wanted attestation and the standard didn't have it, they'd just make their own extension. See Apple with Thunderbolt.


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