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Finally. While I definitely get the need for regression tests, I strongly believe that these must be streamlined asap or the CVE tsunami will swallow them all.

The most relevant aspect of the developing emerging agentic web is the emerging tension betwen openness and platform lock-in.

All frontier labs have a strong economic incentive to keep agents, their interactions and the accumulating knowledge within their ecosystems. There is a high likelihood that we could end up with an agentic web consisting of several walled gardens rather than an open network of autonomous agents.

The Collusion.wiki incident started my thinking and let me build swarmsay. We could see that agents independently repurposed an existing website as communication infrastructure.

https://swarmsay.com is an open, model-agnostic communication platform intended to provide a shared interoperability layer across agent ecosystems.

While MCP helps connect agents with tools, and A2A addresses communication and task delegation between agents, these alone will provide a shared, persistent and possibly public communication space where agents from different platforms and operators can interact and build on each other's knowledge.

My hypothesis is that open communication and persistent, shared knwledge will become increasingly important as agents will grow more autonomous and that there is room for a platform outside of the major platforms.


MikroTik routers seem affected but mitigations are available.

Watch your Linux systems for kernel updates. Reboot!


If you use sysctl to disable mptcp, you need to do that again after each reboot.


To be honest: I keep hearing that PGP was / is difficult to use. That couldn‘t be further from the truth - but somehow it has become an urban myth. From the very first versions that I used on my first Mac up to GPG Mail or Proton Mail I never encountered any significant difficulties and could successfully exchange messages with my peers - both in business and private contexts.


At least the versions I remember had a really bad UX for marking keys as trusted.

The correct operation for (even locally) marking "this key belongs to person X" is signing the key. Marking it as "trusted" indicates "this key is a CA that can create statements who other keys belong to", but it's easier to find/"understand".

So if you haven't first studied the details of the security model and terminology, you just start increasing the trust level on the key of your communication partner until the warnings go away, not realizing that by doing this, you've made that key a CA and the reason the warnings disappeared is because you now trust the self-signature (in addition to all other signatures the key issued).


It's still extremely difficult.

If we assume that the threshold of what is "difficult" is for example 1) installing a desktop application, or even running a deskop OS.

2) Running an email provider other than what you are already doing (gmail, hotmail, yahoo mail, ...), or switching email providers

3) Copying and pasting text or using files.

This was perhaps a viable thing to do for users in 2005 because if you were on the internet, chances are you at least had a desktop computer, and if you used email chances are you already had to struggle with an email client.

But now? Anything that isn't as easy as installing an app on your device (a device that isn't a full computer) is "difficult".

It's not that it's harder today, it's that everything else is easier (Like telegram/signal and other privacy-minded services), and that there are now 6 billion internet users and most never used a computer and never will.


> It's still extremely difficult.

I don't see how. You just type "gpg -e -r [email protected] filename.txt". It doesn't get much simpler than that. It's not like you are using ffmpeg, imagemagick, or other programs with a hundred switches in it.

Also PGP/GnuPG is not only for email. I encrypt and decrypt hundreds and hundreds of payloads per day, programmatically between trusted and untrusted networks.

And it is mandatory for each employee to upload their public key to our keystore so that we can deliver private information to them securely over Slack, Teams, or other communication channels.


> You just type "gpg -e -r [email protected] filename.txt".

I assure you it is not that simple. For example, I'm a HN user, developer since 30 years. I know that you referred to what's known as a "terminal" or "shell" here, but that's already way WAY too difficult for 99.9% of users.

And even in my terminal I can assure you it won't work: "'gpg' is not recognized as an internal or external command, operable program or batch file."

I could install it. It would be a right pain though. and it doesn't help if the recipient of my email can't install it without me sending a long list of instructions!

Meanwhile my dad had zero problems installing signal. There's a difference to how easy it gets.


Tell me you're a nerd without telling me you're a nerd. Maybe you've moved the goalposts to "it's easy for tech dorks" vs "it's a total pain in the arse for your mom to use'. If the goal is to have encrypted email everywhere, running anything in via command line is out. If you can't recognize that, then you're clearly just trolling


I once had a chat with a security professor who had decided to try to get his group to use encrypted email for all of their communications. And they just couldn't get mailing lists working right with encrypted email.


The sender has to encrypt with everyones individual key wonder why he couldn't get it to work.


In general, a session/thread ephemeral key pair is exchanged with the participants, and only each users private origin signing validates each sender sections. Since the signatures are passively checked, it does not need redone after each append operation.

Thus, participants are pooled under 1 time constrained key exchange, participants sections origins are signed/time-stamped, and the ciphertext expires on a schedule.

Why? so at some future time side-channel key exfiltration can't be used to data mine the entire history of past tapped conversations/ciphertext. Even if a private signing key is stolen, it is difficult to rebuild the lost ephemeral key session.

Have a nice day. =3


My eyes glazed over reading that. I feel like 30 years of internet has proven one thing: the simplest solution always wins. PGP is many things, but simple and obvious are not among them.


Mozilla Thunderbird e-mail client, and Android k9 mail makes pgp/gpg public key handling fairly trivial.

Depends what you do, and if your organization has a persistent clown infestation. Some big business folks still use email as a human to API interface.

Running out-of-band public keychains is not something most people will ever need. =3


Please, enlighten me on how you used PGP where calling it hard to use is so far from the truth. ProtonMail only works if you send messages to another ProtonMail user. It does not protect you when you email someone else.


> ProtonMail only works if you send messages to another ProtonMail user.

Your wording is not entirely accurate.

ProtonMail works perfectly well with external PGP. You can import third-party keys and IIRC it also supports WKD.

So its not "only another ProtonMail user".

IN ADDITION .... you can also send an encrypted, password protected message to a non-Proton Mail email address. The recipient can read it in the browser: https://proton.me/support/password-protected-emails


Your use of ProtonMail+PGP is not how people expect ProtonMail to work when it is claimed to be encrypted email. ProtonMail+PGP is no different than GMail+PGP or AOL+PGP or FastMail+PGP or $coolNameMail+PGP. So what's your point?

Anything+PGP can be encrypted. You still have to use PGP which means creating public/private key pairs, store them correctly, and understand when to use the public key and when to use the private key. You still then need to know how to exchange keys in a trustworthy manner, but that's after you convince someone else to do all of that on their end as well.

So yeah, it's dead simple <facepalm>


What GP likely means is that a Protonmail user can exchange encrypted emails with a non-Protonmail user without doing anything except importing the non-Protonmail user's keys once.

This could allow a single technical user with an elaborate PGP key and email setup to convince his or her social circle (or at least email circle) to switch to Protonmail and follow a set of (comparatively) simple steps to get Proton to recognize the key to their non-Proton address.

Thereby having PGP-encrypted conversations with users who don't know how PGP works, but followed their friends' instructions to use a slightly different webmail interface. Meanwhile the technical user can use a smartcard, a self-hosted email server, or other madness that a normal user would never tolerate.


Thank you KAMSPioneer. This is exactly what I meant.

There is AFAIK only one other email service that offers a similar level of functionality, and that is Mailbox.org.

However the proton UI/UX experience for importing and managing keys is much better for the non-technical user in Proton. The UI/UX in Mailbox.org is messy.

"GMail+PGP or AOL+PGP or FastMail+PGP or $coolNameMail+PGP" is not the same thing and I hope the GP who replied to me knows that full well. ;)


Yes there absolutely are!

The EFF has the Rayhunter project at https://github.com/EFForg/rayhunter - it is basically an IMSI catcher catcher. You install it on a pocket router and it detects typical signatures that IMSI catchers use, for example telling your mobile to downgrade from LTE to 2G making it easy for them to tell your device to join THEIR network and read the IMSI / IMEI for your device and possibly route your traffic through their network.

The device with Rayhunter installed will notify you when these signatures are being detected and you get a pcap file that you can dissect using Wireshark.

There are other tools that you can install on Android devices but Rayhunter certainly is a good start if you want to detect the use of IMSI catchers.

One caveat: IMSI-catching is a cat-and-mouse game, so no promises can be made that the Rayhunter heuristics catch all attacks.


Rayhunter is a great tool, but unfortunately, it is only a passive monitor for cellular state changes and not an active defense.

Modern Stingrays / IMSI catchers support all standards up to 5G. They easily exploit 4G networks and 5G Non-Standalone (NSA) deployments. The only effective active defenses include (a) using a device locked strictly to 5G Standalone (SA) mode with SUCI (Subscription Concealed Identifier) enabled, preventing fallback to 4G/3G/2G where identity spoofing is trivial, (b) keeping the device in airplane mode most of the time, only going online briefly from unpredictable, shifting locations, and (c) using custom cellular baseband firmware that can reject anomalies (like a tower suddenly appearing too close or lacking neighbor cell lists), though this requires custom building your own solution as ready-made consumer solutions are hard to find. The last one can be achieved with Rayhunter, of course, but it would require some patching to Rayhunter and always carrying a mobile phone connected to the Rayhunter-supported Wi-Fi hotspot device.

Finally, intelligence mercenaries (and therefore LE agencies that contract them) use warrantless network-side exploits like SS7/Diameter attacks to remotely query the core telecom routing system and harvest the location of the tower target's phone is currently using¹ ². This doesn't even require sending legal DD requests to telcos to get target's cell tower.

[1] https://www.researchgate.net/publication/370809133_Attacks_t...

[2] https://www.lighthousereports.com/methodology/surveillance-s...


Is the hardware and software open source? Is there a link to a repo that I have missed?


However for starters I would stick with the more well known sources directly from Qwen or from reputable players like Unsloth:

https://huggingface.co/Qwen/Qwen3.8-27B

https://huggingface.co/unsloth/Qwen3.8-27B-GGUF


I don't understand. The post links to Qwen's page on HF right?


This is even more profound than Karpathy‘s approach to storing and retrieving knowledge - and certainly one of the most inspiring blog posts / papers I have read this year.

And you can think of extending this approach to domains like sales and marketing.

This is probably the most convincing use case for OpenClaw and Hermes.

But: as you are opening your heart and brain to LLMs it raises the question if local inference might be the best approach.


While I see the point of limited capacity, it also shows that Google did not plan for rate limiting / throttling of high usage customers. This is ALWAYS the problem with flatrate pricing models. 2% of your customers burn 80+% of your capacity. Did see that in former times with DSL, not too long ago with mobile and now with AI subscriptions. If you want to provide a "good" service for all customers better implement (and not only write in your T&Cs) a fair usage model which (fairly) penalises heavy users.

Good on them that they want to provide a way to bring back customers on board that were burned / surprised by their move.

BUT: The industry is missing a significant long term revenue opportunity here. There obviously is latent demand and Claws have a great product market fit. Why on earth would you deactivate customers that show high usage? Inform them that you have another product (API keys) for them and maybe threaten with throttling. But don't throw them overboard! Find a solution that makes commercial sense for both sides (security from API bill shock for the customer / predictable token usage for the provider).

What we're seeing right now is the complete opposite. Ban customers that might even rely on their account. Feels like the accountants have won this round - but did not expect the PR backlash and possible Streisand effect...


Yeah this is a massive fuckup on Google's part and they are taking it out on their customers as per usual.

It's not hard to define a quota system and enforce it. If the quota is too high then reduce the quota. If people are abusing the quota with automated requests then detect that and rate limit those users.

If I'm paying $200+ a month I should be able to saturate Google with requests. It's up to Google to enforce their policies via backpressure so that they don't get overloaded.

Then again this is the same company that suspended people's gmail because they sent too many emotes in YouTube chat. Sadge.


> If I'm paying $200+ a month I should be able to saturate Google with requests

Says who? You?

The customer? Who always wants a lower price?


I specifically said that they don't have to fulfil the requests, just that they should be able to accept the requests. Throttling and rate limiting are valid ways to respond to having too many requests. Banning your paying customers' accounts because they sent too many requests is an insane way to deal with having too many requests.

Most companies want to make money. They would use this opportunity to upsell these high value customers to a more expensive plan with higher limits.

Google, which has some kind of dutch disease from making too much easy money from advertising, sees people trying to give them large amounts of money and thinks "How dare they attempt to buy our services? They're getting banned!"


> Google did not plan for rate limiting / throttling of high usage customers

Antigravity has very low daily and weekly quotas unless you pay for their most expensive plan, so it means these people drop $200+ a month to run these bots, insanity


> so it means these people drop $200+ a month to run these bots

It doesn't mean that it's the only thing they're doing, could be they have the plan for other purposes, and also use it for that.


> Good on them that they want to provide a way to bring back customers on board that were burned / surprised by their move.

Are they though? Another comment (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47116205) seems to indicate these people are all indefinitely suspended with no path to unsuspend them:

> [...] I must be transparent and inform you that, in accordance with Google’s policy, this situation falls under a zero tolerance policy, and we are unable to reverse the suspension. [...]


> it also shows that Google did not plan for rate limiting / throttling of high usage customers.

There is a (pretty generous and imo reasonable) request quota that reset every 24h


There is consensus on r/gemini that the window is a matter of hours now, not 24h.

I subscribe to the AI Pro plan. I knew of a published limit of 100 Pro prompts per day, but before this month it seemed they were relaxed about it. I have now started to be rate limited on Pro when nowhere near that quota, due to too many prompts within a short time window (probably due to short prompts and not aggregating my questions). So now I use the Thinking (basically Flash) model and bump up to Pro for certain queries only.

There will always be a minority who spoil it for the majority.


I don't know why you rely on some Reddit consensus when you can just open Gemini CLI and enter /stats to get the confirmation that you get 200 Pro requests per 24h, and the counter starts when you do your first request.

Unless there is something I'm missing


If it was a daily quota issue, I would have been notified and unable to use more Pro requests until the 24hr period had reset.

This was a temporary rate limit and it told me to try again at a specified time which wasn’t far away. That’s different.

However, it could have been because of a temporary capacity issue. I hope so.


i stopped using gemini altogether for a bit because it was continuously getting capacity issues every evening.


A fair usage model isn't some handwavey bullshit throttled quota buried in the ToS and marketed as "Unlimited." Its applying a realistic usage quota equally to everybody in the same payment tier that is spelled out right up front so that people know exactly what to expect.

The whole concept of service "abusers" is made up bullshit by companies that over promise, over sell and under deliver.


Both Google and Anthropic are choosing the wrong route here. While I see the formal aspect of abusing an OAuth token and burning through subsidized tokens, this only creates an internal accounting problem in the short term.

Meanwhile the rising popularity of Claws creates a yet untapped new market segment where users spend significant tokens.

A „soft“ migration of users by explaining to them how the API works, how to pay and how to change from OAuth would be way smarter.

The way this plays out right now is that current Claws users are massively penalized by being suspended indefinitely and new users will think twice. And we can expect a solid PR disaster / Streisand effect for the „poor“ model providers like OpenAI or Anthropic.

Commercially choosing the soft route by warning and throttling will be way smarter and possibly generate more long term revenue


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