Could be general polarisation, or just that it's a "but in my case it is different" visceral response.
While people might not be moved by data, it would be interesting if some more public information on what people actually use was available. Imagine data points like unpatched/unpatchable iOS or Android devices being multiple percentages, or outdated browsers. Similarly, the effort per app/OS combination; if it costs X to support Y configuration, then it would be somewhat easier to see if it's more about the will to do anything rather than real-world problems.
The scope is much smaller than that: restriction on what banking conveniences are provided.
> Most of us understand the desire to protect customers from fraud
> At some point, the cost of preventing additional fraud, including the loss of individual choice and autonomy, exceeds the benefit
> Could we aim for proportionate
I think you have answered your own question here; if a less than single percentage of retail customers use something that's not a general iOS or Android device, anything beyond that is not really worth it until regulation says otherwise.
> The scope is much smaller than that: restriction on what banking conveniences are provided.
The freedom to install whatever OS you like on your own phone?
> if a less than single percentage of __________ anything beyond that is not really worth it
My goodness one could fill in that blank in so many different ways, and all of the ones I can immediately think of would drag this thread straight into any number of dire arguments, so I'd better not.
This is about the bank. You get a service from the bank. The bank has to make a trade-off which services they want to provide under which conditions.
Somewhere, 100 steps later, you might get to a "which OS on which hardware" aspect, but that's so far removed from normal life for the meaningful customer base that unless you want to stretch the scope of the post two orders of magnitude bigger than it is, it's not even close.
The bank makes a tradeoff, usually based on money: if they lose 5 customers because they can't use a specific app on a specific OS on a specific piece of hardware, they aren't going to care.
You can apply that to most businesses, especially the profitable ones. You shouldn't be surprised by that.
You might be overthinking it. Most people want to use their phone for convenience, and if an app allows them to remove just one step in their banking activities, they'll probably do that.
As for the second part (separate authentication methods), sure, would be rather problematic if they require you to have a phone, but that's a completely separate and different issue.
Companies tend not to do illegal things. Especially if they’re public or have shareholders that might lose significant value if found out. And it’s borderline impossible to stop people finding out.
Companies tend not to do illegal things when they're likely to get caught.
The trouble with data laws is that once they have your data, they're the only ones who actually know what they're doing with it. Which means the thing you need to prevent is them having it, which is typically not the thing those laws do.
You can check what data is getting collected (e.g. decompile their distributed app at different versions), and you can - as a government - actually just go to their servers and check what they are doing (with necessary permits and lawful action), or even mandate them to show the source code.
> You can check what data is getting collected (e.g. decompile their distributed app at different versions)
Which only helps if you're trying to prevent them from collecting the data rather than use it for a given thing, which is the thing they're not doing.
As an obvious example, if they keep all your files/messages on their cloud storage by default, they have all your files/messages by default.
> and you can - as a government - actually just go to their servers and check what they are doing (with necessary permits and lawful action)
Which generally only happens when you have reason to suspect they're doing something, which is the thing you wouldn't have when they're the only ones who know that they're doing it.
And even if you do go to look at the servers they have in your jurisdiction, there is no way to tell that the data hasn't been copied to servers outside of your jurisdiction, or what is happening to it over there.
You seem to give too much credit for these companies and too less credit for governments.
First of all, most companies just want to make money, with minimal risk. It's significantly easier to make money when you are at worst doing grey area stuff and stay mostly legal (or even "better" is to lobby your thing into being legal). And any info known by more than 2 people is no longer a secret, and you ain't paying enough to your employees to lie under oath for their employer. So no, I don't believe it's happening all too often, and even if it does happen it's mostly out of ignorance, not a deliberate attempt to go against the law.
> It's significantly easier to make money when you are at worst doing grey area stuff and stay mostly legal (or even "better" is to lobby your thing into being legal).
Look at the stuff Apple does, openly and in front of everybody, in response to laws they don't like, e.g. EU DMA. Now what is a scummy surveillance corporation going to do in the face of a law which there is no easy way to tell if they're violating?
> And any info known by more than 2 people is no longer a secret, and you ain't paying enough to your employees to lie under oath for their employer.
Consider how a large company works. Suppose as many as 95% of the employees are honest and/or risk-averse. Those 95% don't do it. When the remaining 5% do it without even being asked to because it's the thing that makes number go up and number going up is what gets them a bonus, they aren't going to tell on themselves and the other 95% don't even know that it's happening. Really the other >99% because 5% of people being willing to do it doesn't require 5% of people to be in on it.
> even if it does happen it's mostly out of ignorance, not a deliberate attempt to go against the law.
Getting screwed by ignorance rather than malice is still getting screwed.
Watch what comes out about Samsung TVs in Europe in the next few days.. the companies do mountains of illegal things because everything devices send/receive is encrypted now and they thought they'd never get caught. After a couple of firmware updates and CA certificate fixes for the eMudhra vulnerability, people will forget all about it and they will go back to doing it.
On GrapheneOS you can install your bank app in a different user profile, and run Google Play sandboxed, so this scenario of a bank app doesn't result in anyone having access to your other information.
Note that the user profiles aren't the basis of sandboxing. The bank app is still sandboxed, and GPlay as well if you only use a single profile. Profiles have use cases of course, they offer separate app data, user data and VPN configurations. They also have a separate list of apps marked as installed, a list apps can see in a profile. IPC also can't take place cross profile, which is useful to prevent communication between apps based on mutual consent. Also nice is that they offer separate encryption keys and can be put at rest manually. In the past they also had the advantage of having a separate clipboard but this isn't an advantage anymore given that GrapheneOS recently shipped within-profile clipboard control.
If you dont need any of the above its perfectly fine to run the banking app on your single, main profile.
Android apps are isolated by default. Graphene can do a bit more, but overall Google Play store doesn't get access to your app data. So what I meant is that your banking data is as safe from the store in the app as it is in the browser.
> As for the second part (separate authentication methods), sure, would be rather problematic if they require you to have a phone, but that's a completely separate and different issue.
It's getting somewhat annoying nowadays with banks pushing that crap, but fortunately legislation for access of people with disabilites forces them to provide tokens still.
A lot of them now switched to banking apps on the phone acting as token without a chance to opt out, though, so as a result I've stopped doing anything bank related on phones nowadays.
Some of this stems from the idea that everything can be reduced to logic, so as long as we solve for all logical states, the end result will be perfect.
Of course, the second you start interacting with the real world and with humans, that doesn't really apply anymore and you have to get to 'good enough' much earlier than a generator would be able to predict.
Even if you steer a model to a very specific goal with an easy to validate end state, it will do things that within the scope and context of the goal a human would not really do. In theory if you put the context of the entirety of a human into a model, you might be able to get much closer, but we don't even have enough power generation on the planet to process that (unless someone has a secret ten orders of magnitude more efficient way of doing that).
They still have webkit builds for Windows and Linux etc, and you still don't need to buy anything special to run it. I think they also have a (mostly?) headless one, and a mini-browser which is intended to test the engine (so it doesn't have things like bookmarks or profiles or anything like that, a good fit). Similar options exist for FireFox and Chromium so it's not really a Safari/Webkit special. Usually gets used when you use a standard containerised browser testing CI step.
Either way, if someone is still manually testing their website instead of using a standard automated testing system you're probably not really in a league where this matters anyway.. and if they are, you probably have a device farm already.
Not sure where the "my thing is so important, I have to test it on a real device, but I can't pay for it" niche is.
You can assume that any company at a large scale will not want to divulge any information unless absolutely necessary. Doesn't matter if you or I think that it might not need to be secret or might not be competitive. Unless there is both an internal push, a need and a sort of proof dat the information can be released, it will never happen. You'll usually find thing that are simplified or aggregated for PR and marketing, or things that are required for legal reasons, but everything else stays internal.
Windows has virtualisation based sandboxing and NT has object-level security (albeit not often used correctly and granularly) and macOS has (among other things) SIP and a subsystem called sandbox that does exactly what it says: it sandboxes. It can sandbox in comparable namespace terms (like cgroups v1 or v2, but more in translocation style execution since it's a MAC framework) yet it also does it a much more fine-grained level depending on what you need. It is used by launchd and applications by default, some entitlements require it so if you want to do some broad kind of elevated application, you also have to have a specific sandbox profile. It's also been around for 16 years, and comes with a ton of examples if you wanted to use it yourself to constrain some process. Yes, it can do filesystem (would be pointless without it), but also does ipc, io, network, memory, fcntl, sysctl, mach ports, sys calls, processes, ui, sockets, messaging, events and all of that including context-aware filtering and compound matching for all of them. And if that's not enough there is also ESF and NEF, the latter only working on networking. You can compare those two to eBFP LSM and XDP. If you want all of this on linux, you'll need to add a lot of custom eBPF and LSM as well as always run in a hypervisor for guaranteed IOMMU usage, but you can't use bare KVM for that either, so you'll either need to never touch the privileged kernel (not even give it a console) or you need to run Xen and use XSM.
Flatpak is just a cheap container copy. Can't do anything beyond what cgroups and things like apparmor and selinux can do, and uses a runtime to do soft higher-level policy functions that translate down to the same primitives. If anything, it's a great bundler, but doesn't do anything new policy-wise.
So, can you get the macOS-level capabilities (both low-level and higher abstractions)? On Linux, yes, but they don't exist yet. On Windows: technically possible, but since that would break most GUI workflow it's not likely that anyone is going to bother, and you're going to have a hard time recompiling windows yourself to make that happen.
Hello, can you tell me if I can filter syscalls made from a memory address in macos without virtualizing the process, or requiring special entitlements and root? I currently have a project where sandboxing is important and i need to prevent all syscalls from a region. This is very simple in linux, and on openbsd i dont have to do anything because openbsd by default does not allow untrusted callsites from making syscalls (and the region in this case is not loaded by openbsd's dynamic loader).
On macos i currently virtualize the process itself, but this has virtualization overhead and some emulation overhead because macos does not let you map all the host process pages to a guest.
I don't think so, the XNU and macOS LS architecture doesn't assume you're going to do policies based on the internal memory topology of a process. It's usually done with multiple processes and having one be very constrained doing only some very specific calls and the other not being able to do any calls at all.
You can probably get by with mprotect or mach internals, but if you're developing at that level you've probably already either implemented or dismissed that.
It's a bit of a different architecture with PAC/MIE/APRR (and to a degree AMFI) being used to prevent abuse that would require syscall filtering in the first place. While I personally don't think that's airtight, it does appear to work out well for their ecosystem.
Edit: come to think of it, region-based call filtering is never really going to be enough on its own, if you don't combine it with other techniques it's basically a rop gadget fest. Probably also why SBX went for intent rather than trying to do it based on location/origin.
Wouldn't it have made more sense for Claude to suggest using the existing Linux-Airprint-VM project/product that already does this exact thing?
There's even a zero-install method via https://printervention.app where it runs that Linux VM isolated inside a WebUSB-capable browser. That website itself was posted right here on HN not too long ago.
I get that the LLM code assistant software prefers writing stuff, but constantly re-writing the same solution seems a bit inefficient.
Are you sure that approach would work? Usually I find these sort of projects end up not working just for the specific device I happen to have, which is always unsupported lol.
It's been extensively reported on, and any AWS user that clicks on the health dashboard would also have seen it, even if they don't consume from news outlets.
As for use it gets: plenty of use, mostly when someone needs to have their worlds close to that area (usually latency or legal reasons). There are a lot of smaller businesses that lost a lot (or maybe even everything) because their never thought they would need to create backups in a different region. Most of that wasn't really reported on but instead gets shared on various platforms like Reddit.
> Are you implying that something that gets reported on, shouldn't be on HN?
> Off-Topic: Most stories about politics, or crime, or sports, or celebrities, unless they're evidence of some interesting new phenomenon. If they'd cover it on TV news, it's probably off-topic.
How is it crazy? It's perhaps not granular (the repository is the boundary, and that's that), but you can definitely restrict who can pull or push as easy as you can make rules for SSH.
Plenty of not-very-granular "enterprise" systems out there, it's not exactly unique to not always have full ACLs on the smallest of objects.
While people might not be moved by data, it would be interesting if some more public information on what people actually use was available. Imagine data points like unpatched/unpatchable iOS or Android devices being multiple percentages, or outdated browsers. Similarly, the effort per app/OS combination; if it costs X to support Y configuration, then it would be somewhat easier to see if it's more about the will to do anything rather than real-world problems.