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When we started C1.ai - 2020 - as someone who worked previously at Okta - I made a decision to only implement OIDC. (see article for all of the reasons). We were worried in the first 2 years, that some big enterprise would force us to implement SAML.

But it turns out, all the major IDPs support OIDC now. It's a non-issue.


it's happening?

"Ex-Intel executives raise $21.5 million for RISC-V chip startup":

https://www.aheadcomputing.com/

I believe the founding team is all in Oregon - and mostly all ex-Intel.


Yes, these folks came out of Intel Labs. But that's also a fabless startup. When you start talking about fabs you're talking about needing real money (in the multi billions of dollars). That kind of funding could only come from the likes of Apple and Nvidia.


They did not come (directly) out of Intel Labs. They left because they were working on a moonshot project that lost corporate support. Just like Ampere computing, just a few years later.


okta is not "active-active" in a multi-region sense, they run in a single active AWS single Region per-tenant. You can pay extra to have a faster failover in a region level failure scenario:

https://support.okta.com/help/s/article/overview-of-enhanced...


per <https://trust.okta.com/security-advisories/okta-ad-ldap-dele...>

2024-07-23 - Vulnerability introduced as part of a standard Okta release

This issue is not an "okta is old" issue. this was new code written in 2024 that used a password hashing function from 1999 as a cache key.


Bcrypt is still perfectly usable for its original purpose. They just picked/wrote a bad implementation that silently truncated inputs longer than the maximum input length. Would you also ask why they picked AES (a cipher from 1998) when the error was with the user (e.g. picking fixed/too short key)?


Our app <https://www.okta.com/integrations/conductorone/> is in the Okta OIN ("marketplace") using OIDC? So not sure what you mean by that?


Ooh that's excellent news, thank you! When I'd last checked it was not an option and our account rep had no predictions to offer.


This is an Eclipse foundation project, not an Apache Software Foundation (ASF) project?

it's all volunteers/open source, but this isn't an ASF project.


I'm sorry, I hadn't finished my coffee yet.

I'm gonna go embarrasingly delete this thread tail between my legs...


What about "access controls" for the AuthZ side, instead of Permissions?

Wondering HNs collective wisdom on this-- at work we've been using Access Controls on our homepage for awhile- https://www.conductorone.com/ - to the people outside the IAM-geek space does this make more sense?


I like the idea of exposing Roles for selection, and having those roles generally apply to permissions or workflows internally. This tends to work pretty well for many, or even most applications. I can't stand fine-grained access controls in general.


For this general pattern implemented in Golang, check out redis_rate: https://github.com/ductone/redis_rate

This fork also implements Redis Client Pipelining to check multiple limits at the same time, and Concurrency Limits.


The API for Let's Encrypt to do this requires possession of the private key, which pwned keys doesn't always have. Sometimes they just have an "attestation" of compromise:

https://pwnedkeys.com/submit.html

Which if you had an standardized representation of that attestation, maybe CAs could consume that instead.

But, the author of pwnedkeys thought of that, and started an RFC for exactly that:

https://github.com/pwnedkeys/key-compromise-attestation-rfc/...

But it seems dead right now.


You can also just, Log the spans as they are being created to stderr/stdout -- I've done this on a previous project with this approach of "spans first".

It made it debuggable via output if needed, but the primary consumption became span oriented.


Good idea yeah, but do the same notions of log level apply?


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