This is also a congress-made problem as they privatized the USPS and created this pointless exercise of making them turn a profit, while being regulated like no other company (because that's us admitting we need mail).
The corporate agenda of the past several decades has been to destroy the Constitutional government (which is the only thing bound to our narrowly-construed Constitutional rights) in favor of ceding authority to unaccountable corporations.
I am doing similar with Debian 13 images in QEMU. Only access is to code specifically SSH in. On some, I am taking it a step further and my SSH key is not present at all on the bot. I add it as a git remote from my host into the VM and push and pull from there and then push to GitHub myself. So the agent has no path to GitHub either.
Wow, great notion about using git remote to transfer source from the agent host. I already use ssh into VM to transfer the files like designs for sharing, so going to adopt your approach right now :)
Then I just SSH in or use the vm gui and interact with the agent there. I like to keep it running in byobu so I can remote in more easily when I am on the laptop out and about.
Reading the report alone:
"First, the payload makes sure ~/.ssh exists and appends an attacker-controlled Ed25519 public key to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, setting permissions to 0700 on the directory and 0600 on the file."
A system where ~/.ssh/authorized_keys has not been modified might be a hint that this did not execute - the article does not mention self cleanup/reverting to previous status behavior by the malware. By default /var/log/auth.log is only of marginal value because outbound SSH connections are not logged by default.
A billion humans use AI daily, they write about 0.5T tok and read about 2T tok (estimated). In a week they amount to more than the whole training set of GPT-4. Human language is being shaped back by AI language.
I am fairly glad I have stuck with stock OpenSSH that ships with Linux. This incident proves I am glad with that choice.
Over the decades, I have maintained remote access through port forwarding on my router - at one point in 2008 I put SSH on port 80 so I could access it from the restricted wifi network at the hospital my grandmother was at. I have also used openvpn. I have also used cloudflare tunnels. But in the end, I always connect to hardened openssh with key only authentication.
Clearly, but of all the ways to manage authorized keys on a fleet of endpoints was this particular methodology the only or best? Were there other ways to activate and deactivate keys without introducing the same complexity and brittleness. Clearly the ACL methodology provided a false sense of security in this instance in the presence of this bug.
No, it doesn't sound like it. Tailscale reduces complexity. It literally is key distribution with an ACL.
I work at a finance org with hundreds of engineers and thousands of technical users. You cannot be compliant with finance compliance frameworks using OpenSSH without audits and traceability and some source of identity management. That is exactly what Tailscale (or an alternative product) provides.
> and now, bugs
If you do it yourself, you now own that software entirely. Your comment lacks understanding of the complexity of real world scenarios.
How does having an SSH CA help you roll out detailed access to hosts/ports/services with fine grained permissions via access control lists derived from your identity provider? How do you make sure you're giving out least privileges with a compliant onboarding/offboarding and audit process? That is where the real meat is.
If you've solved all these problems yourself at your org: congrats, you re-implemented Tailscale with a bespoke solution that takes orders of magnitudes more $ to maintain and audit regularly than just buying an industry trusted solution.
Tailscale is, all things concerned, really cheap. It costs less at my large org than a single engineer. Doing it ourselves would take a team. Maybe two. Once again, HM primarily comments from a naive engineer's perspective, not from a leadership view.
Adding complexity would imply you're doing both. In this case it would be more correct to say you're trading the complexity of key distribution and access control via keys for the complexity introduced by tailscale ssh.
I gather the bug allows people you've explicitly authorized to ssh into some account on your machine, to access more than that account can. So if you only use ssh yourself, or only give ssh keys for users with sudo, or only to people you trust not to exploit this, or if other vulnerabilities allow local shell users to escalate, or if you only use tailscale for port forwarding, then you're unaffected. Arguably even less exposed than a public openssh instance, though I can't say I have any issue doing that
Of course it is, if you rely on that boundary. The 'consumer' use of tailscale is just as a reverse proxy, and that's how I figured GGP sees it. I don't have anyone on my tailnet, and when I did they didn't have ssh keys, and if they did I imagine there'd be many paths to privilege escalation, certainly it's a bigger surface than sshd. So I was clarifying it seems like an escalation from authorized execution to privileged execution, and not e.g. from unauthorized users to RCE
I run WireGuard VPN on port 443 UDP. Many times I can connect to that from various public WiFi networks like coffee shops and public libraries. And then I ssh into my machines at home over my self-hosted VPN.
I’ve been hoping that HTTP3 adoption would make 443 UDP accessible from even more places. But maybe they already do the kind of thing you said for that too, looking at the traffic flow to determine that it is not HTTPS.
Weirdly sometimes there are WiFi networks where I am not able to connect to my WireGuard VPN on 443 UDP, but I can connect to servers over ssh on standard port 22 TCP. Perhaps they sometimes block all UDP traffic because they don’t want people to use BitTorrent etc, but one would think that with all the online meeting platforms that do video streaming there would be a lot of problems for people if all UDP traffic was blanket blocked.
I might eventually try out AmneziaWG instead of vanilla WireGuard, but at the moment I am fine not being able to Connect to my VPN sometimes. I only use it to connect to my other machines anyway, not as a VPN tunnel for my web browsing etc.
it's possible commercial routers such as the ones utilized by restaurants allow wireguard through these days? wireguard makes no effort to be stealthy when emitting.
some VPN apps bypass wireguard blocks automatically by using https tunnels and whatnot.
Does mosh help with it? Seems to be based on udp, and it looks good. I am not entirely sure if it helps the issue that you are talking about so hoping for someone more experienced to chime in
Naive. There's not much that prevents you from running ssh over https. Not even traffic patterns will give you up in the age of ubiquitous websockets and/or http2 streams.
> Not even traffic patterns will give you up in the age of ubiquitous websockets and/or http2 streams.
SSH is dead simple to detect, because the server sends an outbound greeting in ASCII text; and the client doesn't send anything until it gets the greeting. The binary protocol does not look like a TLS stream at all either.
Its not always the case but many of MITM-ing corporate firewalls are going to immediately drop any TLS connection they can't decrypt on the basis they're coming from an unauthorised device.
Cancer is the enemy! I am so sorry to learn of Eric's passing. Sometimes you don't have as much time as you think. We all should do so well as to document everything for our spouses and loved ones. I had a friend who died from cancer and we never truly unraveled all of his accounts for his widow. Live has moved on but stuff including precious memories were lost as cloud accounts were shuttered. Also do not underestimate how many organizations will not transfer accounts to the surviving spouse.
I actually spoke up about this at a local chamber meeting today during my 30 second elevator pitch. I decided to give a brief cybersecurity awareness month pitch about having backups for your 2FA and to be wary of passkeys because you will be locked out on device changes.
I think they are a trap. A usability nightmare. So, I acquiesce to a passkey to a site while on my iPhone and now I cannot log onto it from my work desktop in Firefox. An older person sets it up on his or her Google account, gets a new phone (iPhone to Android) or Android to iPhone doesn't matter and loses access. We know that Google won't help a regular consumer with anything.
Syncing may be a thing in theory but the friction is huge.
It's been a long time since I have tried to do Windows work in C/C++. Is this Win32 the actual Win32 API of yesteryear or something else. I thought CMoke was a Unix tooling.
Neat! I am behind the times. My last major Visual C++ work was version 6.0 when I was a teenager. Then went to Georgia Tech which was 100% into Unix. Then my career never converged back into C/C++ work on any platform.
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