In hindsight, yes that was a bad move (especially considering that my work laptop is still locked to my banned ID…)
As an Apple noob at the time, I assumed that if my MDM-managed device prompted me to log in with my Apple ID, that it of course would be an allowed action.
With regards to data being shared, the only thing I noticed was wifi passwords and peripherals pairing (apple keyboard).
macOS Lockdown Mode is not intended to be used by casual travelers to prevent unintended macOS unlocks.
Per Apple, “Lockdown Mode is an optional, extreme protection that's designed for the very few individuals who, because of who they are or what they do, might be personally targeted by some of the most sophisticated digital threats. Most people are never targeted by attacks of this nature.”
> Track capacity at night is often severly limited by maintenance work
Makes one wonder what it would do to the economics of train transportation if maintenance work was required to be carried out during daytime and passenger transportation was optimised for comfortable sleeper trains.
Kill it. Even assuming we are limiting ourselves to long distance trips (that is commuting to work is still allowed to use tracks during the day), and hand wave away some tricky where to draw the line issues.
Trains work best when the track is used. That means trains need to leave often to keep the track busy. Leave at 9pm, and arrive at 7am sounds great, but you don't get anyone leaving at 2am, which means there isn't enough users to pay for all the infrastructure needed.
Day trains work because some people leave at 8am, some noon, some 6pm... You need enough riders to fill to 70% capacity 3 trains per hour for 13 hours a day just to break even on all the costs of running a train for a reasonable price. (the numbers are approximate and depend strongly on local details). The more often you can run nearly full trains the better. Your night trains can't do this.
The decisions to enable auto update, the removal of `--with-foo` options, breaking the `brew list` command and the removal of `depends_on :x11` were all mistakes, as I see it. I have read loads of issues and pull requests to understand the reasoning but have yet to find arguments that I think justifies those breaking changes.
I get it, it's all made by volunteers, but I wish there was a package manager for macOS that was focused on professional users.
I wonder if the decision process in Homebrew has relied perhaps too much on analytics data leading to the dismissal/ignorance of features used primarily by users who have disabled analytics via the HOMEBREW_NO_ANALYTICS environment flag.
I do not think it was a wise decision to enable auto update on `brew install` as long time users expect `brew update` and `brew install` to be two separate steps (as it was for years) and because Homebrew no longer operates like `apt` and other package managers.
It makes sense semantically to me, and would be fine/preferable if `brew update` only took a few seconds to complete.
Cause otherwise I'm not necessarily going to remember to brew update ever, and am going to be getting old formulae. I think I'm not alone, I suspect this was done because too many users were never updating.
I am not super familair with how apt works, but I think the "workflows" of brew are already different than typical apt uses, with continuous incremental releases, and users expected to stay up to date with them -- things aren't necessarily going to keep working (installing properly) if you never run `brew update`, and I think many users were not.
I do want `brew install` to get me the latest formula for the thing I'm installing.
The problem is when it can add several minutes to a `brew install` invocation, interupting my ability to get on with my business.
But good to know about the env variable so at least I can choose which tradeoff I want!
You claim that somebody thinks it is reasonable policy to ban e2ee. Who is that exactly?
Consider this section from the resolution:
Striking a right balance
The principle of security through encryption and security despite encryption must be upheld in its entirety. The European Union continues to support strong encryption. Encryption is an anchor of confidence in digitalisation and in protection of fundamental rights and should be promoted and developed.
Protecting the privacy and security of communications through encryption and at the same time upholding the possibility for competent authorities in the area of security and criminal justice to lawfully access relevant data for legitimate, clearly defined purposes in fighting serious and/or organized crimes and terrorism, including in the digital world, and upholding the rule of law, are extremely important. Any actions taken have to balance these interests carefully against the principles of necessity, proportionality and subsidiarity.
Whoever wrote: "at the same time upholding the possibility for competent authorities in the area of security and criminal justice to lawfully access relevant data for legitimate, clearly defined purposes in fighting serious and/or organized crimes and terrorism, including in the digital world, and upholding the rule of law, are extremely important".
Either said person doesn't understand end-to-end encryption, or they don't want end-to-end encryption but mere encryption, with keys shared here and there...
No the person you're responding to, but the OP article gives the impression.
Either way I don't understand how the text you pasted intends to "strike the balance" when e2ee is present. Either they're talking about backdoors or they're in fantasyland
They mention access to encrypted data severl times:
>Technical solutions for gaining access to encrypted data must comply with...
They do say:
>there should be no single prescribed technical solution to provide access to encrypted data.
But it's perfectly clear the assumption is that they intend law enforcement to have access to all encrypted data, given the various caveats about doing so legally.
They do mention privacy, but all that means is not making user data public. They make no mention of a right to maintain data private from the government or law enforcement.
Okay I understand the concern, but claiming that there is intent to hold keys to all e2ee is jumping to conclusions. Imagine if investigators could ask authorities for permission to retrieve screenshots from your mobile device if you are under investigation. There would be no need for access to keys.
I am not arguing that this is desirable, but I do acknowledge that investigators may need help to navigate modern technology.
From the same document. I do not see how this is technically possible.
> Technical solutions for gaining access to encrypted data must comply withthe principles of legality, transparency, necessity and proportionalityincluding protection of personal data by design and by default.
If focusing on e2ee I agree, but how about hardware and software supply chains? How much is your e2ee worth if you are up against Apple or Google? Perhaps nation states are simply looking for similar powers?
> got my Macbook Pro from work and signed in to my Apple ID on it.
Wouldn't this result in unintentional data sharing from the work device to your personal devices? (and vice versa)