Hey, I'm Justin from the 501(c)(3) fiscal host of Privacy Guides, MAGIC Grants. Us board members administer the funds for Privacy Guides, and we are different people than those who are on the Privacy Guides committee.
I assure you that Privacy Guides has not made a deal with Brave or any other of the tools that it recommends on the website. I'm happy to address any other questions about raising funds if you have them.
There are lengthy discussions about whether to recommend a tool or not on the Privacy Guides GitHub and their forum. There is a lot of great context there.
> There are lengthy discussions about whether to recommend a tool or not on the Privacy Guides GitHub and their forum
The process doesn't strike me as consensus driven? Mods/team have become gatekeepers (both for persisting with existing recommendations or adding new ones), including aggressively shutting down conversations/threads they personally don't like (I was told, all moderation actions are final, regardless of who on the team does it, even if why they did it doesn't hold water). I imagine, such a rigid setup is in response to prevent bad faith actors (but then, I lose count of how many times team/mods have called others "extremist", using it as a slur, just because ... reasons).
It is hard to definitively prove ulterior motive, but other folks do observe such nefariousness and come to their own conclusions, valid or not, as GP has done.
All that to say, the way it is currently run, "discussions happened" isn't really the defence you think it is.
It's not comparable though. The simplified (though slightly wrong) way to think about Grin is that its privacy is like Monero but without Monero's ring signatures. Its transaction graph privacy is quite weak.
> The Grin team has consistently acknowledged that Grin’s privacy is far from perfect. While transaction linkability is a limitation that we’re looking to mitigate as part of our goal of ever-improving privacy, it does not ‘break’ Mimblewimble nor is it anywhere close to being so fundamental as to render it or Grin’s privacy features useless.
Hiding addresses and amounts is certainly better than Bitcoin, but the transaction graph privacy offered by Grin is significantly weaker than Monero. It's not the same.
I feel you're deliberately being pedantic. There's nothing legally dictating 1 pound of flour = any other 1 pound, but it is fungible, by the definition of them being indistinguishable.
1 NFT isn't the same as any other NFT. They're deliberately non-fungible.
Specific Bitcoin outputs have histories associated with them. While you dismiss this as related to traceability (which is also true), it still stands that one output with a favorable history is preferable to an output that was known to be mined in North Korea.
For these differences, as evidenced by the specific exchange action examples in the linked article, show that different output histories allow companies like Chainalysis, CipherTrace, TRM Labs, and Elliptic to add specific risk scores to outputs. Those with lower risk scores are worth more than those with higher risk scores. This is a breakdown in fungibility.
This largely is not true. While privacy on LN is still being evaluated, it is also extremely complicated. There's no easy "privacy on LN" guide that's industry standard, for example. Monero comparatively is much older and much better understood on the privacy side (eg: see Breaking Monero).
Largely, no. While the full privacy implications of lightning network use are extremely complicated and still being researched (and the best practices updated with that information), it absolutely is not as simple as open/close channel, done.
> Also, with enough time, all the Bitcoins would be dirty.
This is a misconception. Coins are only associated with the last identified node. So for example if I sent tainted BTC to Coinbase, sure Coinbase would investigate my account obviously. But the coins can be used from then on as "clean" Coinbase coins, until they hit the next identified node by blockchain analysis companies.
If you sent funds to Coinbase's provided address and they wanted to refuse/refund it for some reason, your new owned output would likely be marked as clean and from Coinbase.
This may vary across circumstances of course. And they may decide to refuse to issue a refund.
I work for Cake Wallet and Monero.com so I'm biased, but you should try one of the wallets that does this relatively burdensome scanning task locally to see that normally it's not the end of the world. It takes me only a few seconds to scan a month of blocks.
Monero is on Kraken US. Coinbase and Gemini, acting as companies choosing to add the coin they're mutually invested in Zcash instead of Monero, is a dumb indicator to use of what's "allowed," especially when there are obvious compliant examples in the US (Kraken, DV Chain, etc).
The part you quoted was an example of what _not_ to do ("not the time").