> then the failure modes and legal consequences are the same as traditional engineering
Exactly my point! Because the failure mode is the same we should have the same guardrails in place for both.
The design and construction of a bridge is independently inspected and verified. The design and implementation of software in a car is not independently inspected and verified. I argue that because the failure modes are the same, we should change the latter to match the former.
The design of a bridge must carry the signature of an individual licensed engineer who is personally liable. The design of software in a car is functionally anonymous. I argue that because the failure modes are the same, we should change the latter to match the former.
The design of software in a car is held to similar standards as the hardware in a car, as one of the people who sign off on it (and not a PE). The software often is independently inspected and verified as part of homologation.
Adding a scapegoat engineer wouldn't do anything meaningful except ruin one dude's career when something happens because
1) automotive manufacturers don't fall under engineering firm regulations
2) one person cannot have meaningful technical oversight over the scope of a vehicle, and
3) there is no software PE accreditation process in the US.
They've been true for over a century at this point though. Since I assume you aren't complaining about every vehicle ever produced not being signed by PEs, what is it about software that you think it should require a PE stamp when hardware should not?
> They've been true for over a century at this point though.
The duration of the status quo doesn’t feel at all relevant to my argument.
> what is it about software that you think it should require a PE stamp when hardware should not?
Any profession of system design whose failure mode is “people die” would better serve a culture that abhors preventable deaths if governed by the same licensure, liability, professional ethics and independent verification used by electrical and structural engineering. I don’t make any distinction between hardware and software, but this article happens to be about software, so that’s what we’re discussing.
Exactly my point! Because the failure mode is the same we should have the same guardrails in place for both.
The design and construction of a bridge is independently inspected and verified. The design and implementation of software in a car is not independently inspected and verified. I argue that because the failure modes are the same, we should change the latter to match the former.
The design of a bridge must carry the signature of an individual licensed engineer who is personally liable. The design of software in a car is functionally anonymous. I argue that because the failure modes are the same, we should change the latter to match the former.