Likely not common knowledge that Russian, Chinese, and treaty organization observers are hosted at these lab tests and witness them—to verify that no nuclear detonations are taking place.
Scientists call it “tickling the dragon’s tail," Custer said, because the experiment approaches but stays below the stage at which the fission of nuclear materials sustains an ongoing series of chain reactions.
Scientists referred to this flirting with the possibility of a nuclear chain reaction as "tickling the dragon's tail", based on a remark by physicist Richard Feynman, who compared the experiments to "tickling the tail of a sleeping dragon".
> The demon core was a sphere of plutonium that was involved in two fatal radiation accidents when scientists tested it as a fissile core of an early atomic bomb
> In both cases, an experiment was intended to demonstrate how close the core was to criticality with a tamper, but the core was accidentally put into a critical configuration
Right. There's been 33 since then, with two more planned in 2024.
The title is pretty misleading, in that respect. The US can't be "moving closer to" something that it's already doing.
- "Currently, the NNSA is building two new subcritical experimental testbeds at the U1a Complex in Nevada. The testbeds will provide data to help address stockpile questions, with a special focus on the impact of plutonium aging on weapon performance. Since halting underground nuclear explosive testing, the United States has executed 33 subcritical experiments. The United States is preparing to execute two subcritical experiments in 2024 and plans to conduct approximately three subcritical experiments per year by the end of the decade."
Deterrant?, I honestly do not fear Russia, NK or any other nation but the U.S in starting a nuclear war, why? for the simple fact that some idiot think tank somewhere has convinced themselves that such a war in winnable.
The US is the only party that probably will never have a reason to really consider a nuclear first strike: Basically endless conventional options with significant superiority over any potential enemy makes the risk of MAD completely unworkable. The party most likely to go nuclear is the one that has no other avenue to success.
> We haven't won a war against a peer enemy since WW2 and lost most of the wars against non-peers since then.
Sure, but effectively because the US is fighting on terms that nuclear weapons do not really help: The US has more than enough conventional firepower to turn most of the countries it has been at war in to sheets of glass, but the goal is very distinctly to not do that.
Losing wars fought in the streets where you're trying to not kill civilians isn't really a scenario where adding nukes helps.
Depending on the definition of war, that claim can look quite different: perhaps cultures conduct their real clashes not with armaments but with propaganda and economic prowess.
(google and android and apple and iphones might all be examples, as might be science like CRISPR-CAS9, none of which originate in Chinese or Russian labs, though China was smart enough to build factories as a service, for examples, but in some collaboration of european cultures including in the americas).
This would be a great plot opener for a thriller book:
The testing reveals that none of initial batch of warheads tested work. Worry spreads throughout the scientists as they broaden the testing none of the warheads work.
There is full on panic now that the entire US nuclear deterrent has evaporated. If foreign powers found out, the US and all nations under the nuclear umbrella would be subject to blackmail.
That been strongly speculated about the Russian state of nuclear warheads - because those are not properly maintained, none of them works - Russia, despite their wild claims doesn't have any nuclear deterrent as we speak.
So it is likely that they are moving toward doing an actual nuclear test, likely in the atmosphere. Legal framework to move in that direction is currently in progress. They of course try to milk as much leverage they can get in such process - I hope that Western policy makers understand that it will not change the end result - there will be a nuclear test regardless of the amount of concessions they will make.
> That been strongly speculated about the Russian state of nuclear warheads - because those are not properly maintained, none of them works - Russia, despite their wild claims doesn't have any nuclear deterrent as we speak.
I've seen speculation to that effect, but I do think you're talking the conclusion too far: it's reasonable to speculate some of their warheads don't work, but not all of them. While googling your claim, I came across this source (https://thebulletin.org/2009/12/nuclear-weapons-the-moderniz...), which does say the Russians maintain their warheads more poorly, but they compensate for that by re-manufacturing and replacing them regularly.
> So it is likely that they are moving toward doing an actual nuclear test, likely in the atmosphere. Legal framework to move in that direction is currently in progress.
>Russia is in the late stages of a decades-long modernization of its strategic and nonstrategic nuclear forces to replace Soviet-era weapons with newer systems. In December 2022, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu reported that modern weapons and equipment now make up 91.3 percent of Russia’s nuclear triad.
Interesting plot. It would need to have multiple parallel plots where each nation with a nuclear arsenal thinks they are the only one that has lost their nuclear capability. Hijinks ensue as each tries to bluff the national actors.
Nuclear weapons are not very useful when you have good intelligence and a distributed ability to delivey vast amounts of precious-guided weapons.
Nukes just seem like a money pit of maintenance problems and governance.
The UK has ~200 or more nukes. But it's scrimping on building a railway. And it's military is chronically short of money. Just how well do you think those nukes work? Think about the PM. Just how ready is his to engage with a nuclear strike as part of the job.
I think nukes have been a paper tiger for a long time.
I’ve seen way too many people speculate recently that Russia’s nuclear arsenal possibly doesn’t work. This is incredibly dangerous.
What’s the plan when humanity is so many decades into a test ban that nuclear detonations are a generational memory? Something akin to a myth. The relative stability afforded by MAD doctrine is bound to decline.
How long until subcritical experiments need to turn into supercritical ones? At some point you have to do an integration test or no one can say anything of certainty.
Proving a sample of plutonium emits the right dose of radiation when whacked appropriately is a great starting point, but it doesn't validate the rest of the weapon system.
You could test the bombs with inert cores to prove everything outside the physics package is valid, but there is still the "but sometimes" bullshit space where perhaps the core seems good on paper but the neutron initiator has an undue delay related to aging circuitry and we lose 80% of the expected yield. Whatever the case - in isolation both system elements might test OK but they could still fail when combined.
I feel like the dial-a-yield devices are most precarious (e.g. B61). How could you really know you aren't going to over/undershoot massively? What is the range of uncertainty on that system after 3 decades?
Instead of a dumb inert core they use a smart inert core that broadcasts precise measurements of the implosion using fiber optics and triboluminescent capsules that flash as the implosion wavefront crushes them. The computer has to broadcast the data before it itself gets crushed microseconds later. But yes, I still share your overall concern even though we can push the question marks one step later in the delicate process.
There are multiple ways in which nuclear weapons are 'precise'.
The yields are known to precise amounts - with more than 2,000 nuclear weapons already detonated both below and above ground there's a mind boggling array of technical data available.
There's data on the physical impulse of various types of nuclear detonation, and data on how much or little direct radiation is created by doping the core and surrounds.
The effects of those yields is known for a wide range of scenarios; very high in the atmosphere, above the ground such that the blast radius barely touches the ground, at ground level and below ground.
Data exists to show they essentially suck for technical engineering and canal building, they irradiate vast amounts of debris at ground level and create massive clouds of fallout, and that they flatten cities with minimal side effect if detonated high enough for the shock wave to do all the work of crushing buildings.
The precision is sufficient to setup in advance to create 'Dixie Showgirl' bad ballet photoshoots:
Also: we don't want someone lobbing 10x as many warheads because they only think half work
I think a few countries will feel a bit vulnerable at some point (like Poland/Japan/Australia/SouthKorea) and start to question if concepts like the US umbrella is truly a sufficient deterrent, and probably start their own development/testing
When I took a class on strategic nuclear game theory back in the 80s the options were 1, 2 and all, with "all" being the only serious cases. The assumption was the enemy would try to take out all your nukes so you'd have to launch quickly before they were taken out.
Subs, of course, being the ultimate terror weapon, changed the calculus completely. What I really got out of the class was that this kind of game theory was almost useless once you had subs with nukes on them.
"Almost" because antimissile defense was destabilizing even without subs, so is in everybody's interest to negotiate away.
MAD is a scenario, not the only or most likely. There are a million and one scenarios where you have some kind of nuclear conflict and it stays regional. And actually this part is a massive problem for the US since we don’t have a viable tactical nuclear arsenal.
Our strategic options are limited and the US wouldn’t be able to respond tit-for-tat if, say, the Russians started using smaller weapons in a battlefield situation, our only option is to either do nothing, or level a city and escalate the conflict.
This was not considered "strategic" decision making back in the 80s, but I see your point. I do think it's good the US junked its tactical nuke programs (Davy Crocket et al) because they are tricky and hard to find good use cases for. They are also hard not to lose (most people don't realize how many portable things get lost in combat).
Allegedly Russia has various "red lines" which, when crossed would lead to tactical nukes in the Ukraine theatre. Many of those lines have been crossed with no nuke use. Prof Phillips P. OBrien pointed out that tactical nukes at this point would be an admission of weakness and would turn many allies against Russia. Also, like chemical weapons, they are simply hard to use without interfering with your own troops. Probably, IMO, the only use case is on day 0 right at the initial invasion.
The US has a wide range of non-weaponry responses, and who knows what they have in their subs, They may have smaller scale nukes as well. Subs are destabilizing today because nobody knows where they are. They used to be destabilizing because that also meant they were inaccurate (thus only useful against cities, where, like the game of horseshoes, "close" is good enough). Nowadays once they are launched they can use GPS, the stars, and probably simply vision since they know the approximate launch and destination locations.
You're currently getting downvoted which seems unreasonable.
B61s are aircraft delivered gravity bombs, a relic of the 1960s. It’s an entirely different category compared to the short range ICBMs that Russia employs from mobile ground vehicles.
Yes, it's a totally different category from SRBMs - so maybe the US's ability to deliver tactical nuclear weapons more than 10-100km into highly contested airspace is poorer, but given your original scenario (battlefield use and tit for tat vs Russia), I don't see this being a significant limitation?
As it stands today, I have no reason to believe that American aircraft (F-35 and B-2 both carry B-61) cannot conduct operations over the forward areas of Russian ground forces.
Ukraine has been able to use GMLRS and, launch cruise missile strikes into Russian held territory success. Ukraine believes that ATACMS will be viable. I don't believe the current evidence indicates that Russian IADS are capable of sufficiently deflecting/deterring an American air strike.
While game theory is useful when developing nuclear strategy I don't think anyone takes MAD seriously: It isn't subgame perfect. Once the rockets are up, retaliation is no longer credible... because the purpose of the threat of retaliation is to discourage an attack in the first place.
MAD is stable because people aren't rational beings and game theory is therefore nuts.
When I have 500 nukes headed my way, I wont stop to think "well, maybe the remaining 10% of my population can scrape by a living as dogs. Lets not retaliate and maybe they wont launch their remaining 500"
Deep underground in unpopulated areas works fairly well; we learned how to do it without fallout as early as the late 1950s. You're at dramatically greater health risk living downwind of a coal power plant.
> Why would you test them near where someone lives?
Because they're Australians, Pacfic Islanders, gamblers that already visit Las Vegas, etc.
We already have the answer to "why test near where people live" from the 2000+ tests already taken place at Yucca Flat (fallout on Vegas & elsewhere), Emu Fields (Adelaide and a future British PM dusted with fallout), Castle Bravo (shat on people's lovely island home and created Gojira (allegedly)), etc.
With eight billion+ on the planet it's hard to test anywhere without affecting someone - hence the move away from above ground to below ground (Atmospheric testing was banned by the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty) and a later move to simulations only by the US (although not India, Pakistan, North Korea, etc).
Each of the fallout issues you identify stem from atmospheric testing.
Again, we've known how to prevent fallout via underground tests and carefully constructed tunnel layouts for ~70 years now. No one of influence in the West is proposing a return to atmospheric testing.
Underground or overground the answer to the question you posed ( "Why would you test them near where someone lives?" ) is, from past experience, because we (for various values of 'we') just do.
Actual tests of real weapons (not simulations) underground collapse mountains (North Korea) and affect fault lines, sub surface water flows, etc - these things will likely affect some people in a 200 km radius - and places with no one in that vicinity are hard to come by - generally you move people off their islands, off their land, or simply don't care.
I find it somewhat incredible from a pure engineering point of view that Trinity worked in the first test and that both Little Boy (Test #2) and Fat Man (Test #3) also worked.
https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/remarks-nnsa-administra... ("Remarks by NNSA Administrator Jill Hruby at the [Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty]: Science and Technology Conference 2023")
Likely not common knowledge that Russian, Chinese, and treaty organization observers are hosted at these lab tests and witness them—to verify that no nuclear detonations are taking place.