trivial grammar/spelling mistakes are worse than running analogies into the ground without hitting the "context" button, or even the reductio ad absurdium train HN has been on lately.
yes my latin half-Freudian trans-alliterations can be tempting to pick out, i had another tab with stylometry obfuscation described, incident, and mitigated.
also giigles spellcheck sucks ass, and im tired of being gaslit of my word choice/spelling by giigles, who should know every word by now, in all languages
>don't possess deeper level knowledge
umm besides error-correcting codes reducing the bitrate, compression, and random byte padding to fend off correlation/timing attacks, there is no where to hide data, outside of the shannon limit for information thru a medium.
but its easy to hide data you cannot perceive; and everyone being conscious of this feat/fingerprinting, even if barely, does more towards efficacy to deter leaking via second-order "chilling effect" than the aftermath; I.P theft is hard to un-approximate
also stenography, ironically still being the only "real" signature, is still security thru obscurity with more steps; your literal stenographic signature is unique, but not preventable from duplicity, so it is un-obscurable.
if googles' "Add to Dictionary" button worked more than their new 100+ languages i wouldn't felt gaslit by the same words having needed re-googled weekly
yes my latin half-Freudian trans-alliterations can be tempting to pick out, i had another tab with stylometry obfuscation described, incident, and mitigated.
also giigles spellcheck sucks ass, and im tired of being gaslit of my word choice/spelling by giigles, who should know every word by now, in all languages
umm besides error-correcting codes reducing the bitrate, compression, and random byte padding to fend off correlation/timing attacks, there is no where to hide data, outside of the shannon limit for information thru a medium.but its easy to hide data you cannot perceive; and everyone being conscious of this feat/fingerprinting, even if barely, does more towards efficacy to deter leaking via second-order "chilling effect" than the aftermath; I.P theft is hard to un-approximate
also stenography, ironically still being the only "real" signature, is still security thru obscurity with more steps; your literal stenographic signature is unique, but not preventable from duplicity, so it is un-obscurable.
also i know rsa != ECC plz dont