Here's a 2013 blog post from Holden's grandson with a copy of the same story as well as a video and some photos of a visit Holden took with his family to the Duxford Air Museum to see the Lightning (surprising a tour group):
With this single comment at the end left by garyl on Aug 23, 2026: "My father was there, your grandfather was my dad's boss. He was reminding me of the story this morning (he is now 97). He described himself as the new tea boy. Dad was deafened in the right ear as a result of the incident"
Holden passed away in Dec 2016 at 90 years of age:
If you're not a fan you might not know that the Lightning had tremendous performance for its time and long after that time too.
It could climb to 36000ft (11km) in less than 3 minutes. It could pull up off the runway straight into a vertical climb although this wasn't optimal. Apparently it could intercept at 65000ft and this was tested against the U2. It could go supersonic without afterburners in level flight.
All of this gave it relatively short range but it suited its purpose.
It apparently had very good handling but it was full of complicated systems and very powerful so therefore would be a scary thing to have an unexpected flight in.
Love this story. There is something interesting that nags at me though.
- There's a test pilot on staff at the base, but they're not qualified for the Lightning.
- There's a test that needs doing, which doesn't require a test pilot (unless something goes wrong).
- There's no qualified test pilot available for the test, so Holden decides to run the test with someone who knows how to move the plane down the runway, but not necessarily fly it.
Of course you're deviating from the proper process at this point, but isn't the obvious choice for this still the test pilot who isn't qualified for the Lightning, but at least flies fighter jets?
It seems like Holden thought it through - it wasn't spur of the moment. Did he ask the test pilot? If so, did they say "no"?
If I've read the original account correctly, there was no longer a test pilot on staff at the base at the time of the incident:
"In my service, one of my postings took me to 33MU Lyneham where as the CO of a civilian manned aircraft storage unit, I had Canberra, Meteor and Lighting types, which were gradually being prepared for dispatch to various flying unit tasks. When the Meteor and Canberra types had been cleared, the powers that be decided that the MU should be closed after the last Lightning had been dispatched. Up until the last Canberra, I had a qualified and current test pilot on my staff for those aircraft, but he was not a current Lightning pilot. When a Lightning needed test flying, I had to call for any available pilot with a current test pilot rating. Most times I could find one who could be spared within a 24 to 36 hour period."
This paragraph from near the end of that article gives the incident a different feeling:
Some years after the incident, my hidden fears of high speed flight came to the surface and I had to spend two periods in hospital. I had not come to terms with the emotional side of the event
> According to Holden, in a review before Air Marshal Kenneth Porter, he was asked whether he agreed that "With the limited flying experience I had, the test would have been better left to an experienced and current Lightning test pilot", which he answered in the affirmative, following which Porter related some of his own unfortunate flying incidents.
I feel like there’s something between these lines that I don’t understand. Like is this some form of lawyer hacking without lawyers? Like a, “let’s have you admit to something that isn’t really wrongdoing just so we have a thing for the report.”
I (as someone British and from an Army family) read that as - "You know you screwed up right? Please reassure me you know that and won't do anything like it again". Followed by an admission that we all screw up sometimes (implied by the stories).
I have no specific context here, but in case it's not obvious, I think you have to read the exchange in the context of British, and I guess RAF, indirectness and understatement.
I'm guessing the air marshal means "what the hell were you thinking"; Holden is agreeing, indicating that he has learned his lesson and acknowledges the error; and the air marshal is then graciously moving on.
My read is that the Air Marshal was confirming a gap in the orders, which were amended after this flight. Less of a "what the hell were you thinking" and more of a "what the hell were we thinking allowing this in the first place?"
A five-minute "toolbox talk" with an experienced Lightning pilot would probably have been sufficient to warn him of the afterburner detent, and "Let's maybe not do that, eh?"
I appreciate the fact they were able to acknowledge the mistake and get over it.
It was a ballsy move, done with the best of intentions, could have been fine, but near-catastrophically wasn't. Lesson was obviously learned, and both the shortcomings in judgement and in the regs were addressed. I'm glad they let the guy go back to work. It's not like he exhibited a pattern of recklessness. I feel like these days, it's less likely a person of authority would exercise the kind of discretion that leads to a sensible outcome. Not because they don't want to, but because liability and PR have become such institutional boogeymen. ('Course maybe I'm wrong!)
> I feel like these days, it's less likely a person of authority would exercise the kind of discretion that leads to a sensible outcome. Not because they don't want to, but because liability and PR have become such institutional boogeymen. ('Course maybe I'm wrong!)
Who knows, maybe one day we'll find tales of heroism and bravery extend to cover personal integrity against bureaucratic process? It would be a good thing to happen now, in fact, to motivate the current and next generation of people to do the right thing in the world they live in.
EDIT: I suppose the very thing we're discussing is one of such stories.
I think the joke is that Air Marshal Kenneth Porter was chief of the RAF’s maintenance command, and also not a pilot. [0]
Edit: fergal_reid’s reply below is correct. Porter did serve several years at the start of his career as a pilot, in the early 1930s, before spending the bulk of it as a signals officer. Holden also had his wings, but never served as a pilot. I read Porter’s comment as a joke between two RAF officers who were not “really” pilots, but now I’m not sure how to read it.
1. People who don't admit fault are refusing to learn any lesson and that's dangerous. It's the strategy that populist politicians use because someone percentage of people judge you on the confidence of your denial more than on the facts.
2. It's especially convenient if he admits fault because then the blame for people higher up is greatly reduced and the overall fallout from the incident is less. The event could have made the RAF look bad.
Oh, I took this as a bowdlerized version of the actual conversation, which I might be willing to pay to have a copy of if I am right?
"Commander Holden, for posterity, with your limited air time, am I right in suspecting the testing of this experimental aircraft would have been better left to a more experienced pilot?"
"Sir, fookin' 'ell yes sir. And tell 'im what does to pack a second set o' britches."
(Apologies, my knowledge of the British language is limited entirely to Dick van Dyke in Mary Poppins)
That makes the decision seem even stranger. If there really wasn't a qualified Lightning test pilot available, I wonder whether the pressure to get the aircraft moved quickly was the main reason they took the risk. It would be interesting to know what the expected downside of waiting 24–36 hours actually was.
I suspect it was just wanting to get the job done. The difference between this amazing story, and absolutely nothing happening was a fraction of an inch.
Small thing: there is a difference between a "test pilot" and a "maintenance test pilot" or MTP. A test pilot is an elite aviator who participates in the development of new aircraft and systems. An MTP is a pilot trained in prodeedures for verifying functionality of systems after repairs and maintenance. Test pilots are very rare whereas literally every squadron or base should have multiple MTPs availible for each type of aircraft.
That's enough of an oversimplification as to not really be true.
They developed an issue with explosive decompressions, because at the time we didn't fully understand how cyclic stress caused metal fatigue. It is true that they had square-er windows than modern planes, but they knew that and added reinforcement. The stress concentrations inducing fatigue cracks were around square cutouts for an antenna, not the passenger windows.
Also, the windows didn't pop out of their frames. Large portions of the fuselage ripped open.
And they lived a longer service life after the fuselage was reinforced in the areas that cracks were starting, but had trouble overcoming their bad reputation from the earlier explosive decompressions.
Source: the introduction to the Wikipedia article you linked. Read it.
https://web.archive.org/web/20210319185656if_/http://www.nzr...
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