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> under non-adversarial failure modes

There's no distinction to be made if the software is verified. If it fails under adversarial situations, it has failed verification.

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I'm nobody when it comes to formal verification, but I believe there are a lot of simplifications to be made if you have additional assumptions about your system, e.g. information can't be extracted through side channels, or that proxy you use is airtight, or that operating system your systems is designed to run on schedules the tasks correctly. All of these things might not be true, but assuming they're not true is a PITA (and only present under adversarial situations) and leads to a question why don't we completely verify what's underneath first, which is reasonable but not cost-effective.

I was recently exploring moving a verified app to hardware where operating system exploits do not apply.

The simple application consists of state machines with a stable requirements base -- easy to verify, easy to port. But if there is no operating system, it means I need space in the FPGA for an IP core, TCP, and TLS, plus HTTP. Assuming I want a node to saturate a 10GbE link, this works out so something like a 50x multiplier in hardware cost.

And this is the cost factor for an easy case.

The happy medium for "we verified almost everything" is probably something like nano-vms, where you drop the OS kernel for a baremetal runtime. There you have no users, files, root, tasks, threads, etc.


That is about the scope of what is verified. You often choose to only verify one component, but usually you want to build on a foundation of verified components.

The bigger problem is that you usually want to verify a model of the system (higher level, a protocol not an implementation), which has better tooling and solving properties, and then you have a problem of proving correspondence between the model and the implementation. LLM driven proofs could be game changing for that last stage, and better at handling non-ideal machines.




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