A Mig-25 (fielded 1964) was allegedly clocked on radar over Israel in 1973 doing Mach 3.2.
How long it took to figure out that the thing's afterburners were stuck in the full-on position, how long it took to realize it wasn't equipped with adequate targeting or missiles- unknown. While the Mig-31 (1981) was indeed engineered to make a real stand, and this article talks to that, I don't think this article builds a case for or against anyone having any real idea whether the SR-71 (1966) was vulnerable to the Mig-25 or not. If the question is "what repelled the SR71," the question isn't the technical merits of the Mig-31, it's the question of what was known v.s. unknown about what when.
The question of the Mig-25's capabilities were answered more clearly after Viktor Belenko defected with one in 1976. It was not a threat. How long it took to figure that out, and American confidence that Viktor's Mig-25 was as good as any other they'd likely see, remain unknown factors. The Mig-31 (1981) wasn't really much faster, leading to the carefully coordinated chase described in the article, but it at least had an electronics suite, radar, communications link, and armaments capable of making it's threat visibly apparent.
Certainly the Zaslon phased-array radar is impressive and the R-33 missile specs give it the on paper capabilities to hit a SR-71. Yet the article's talks of only two events where an interception occurred, one undated, the second in 1986, after the first major upgrade to the Zaslon radar and the whole time using the very first Soviet in flight digital computer, acquiring targets for a 1970's designed missile the R-33 (fielded 1981).
- The Mig had been manufactured in February 1976 and thus was one of their latest most sophisticated production aircraft.
- Transistor circuitry was not used but instead the Soviets relied on vacuum tubes for most of their electronics.
- The Soviets reasoned the vacuum tubes were less affected by EMP waves in the case of nuclear attack; were more resistant to temperature extremes and they were easy to replace in remote airfields where transistors may not be readily available if repairs were needed.
- Welding was done by hand.
- Rivet heads were exposed in areas not critical to parasitic aerodynamic drag.
- Pilot forward vision was highly obstructed.
- With huge Tumansky R-15D-300 engines the Mig was considered almost a rocket.
- Pilots were forbidden to exceed Mach 2.5. There was a total of three engine instruments and the airspeed indicator was redlined at 2.8 Mach.
- Above Mach 2.8 the engines would overheat and burn up. The Americans had clocked a Mig-25 over Israel at Mach 3.2 in 1973. Upon landing in Egypt, the engines were totally destroyed. We did not understand that the engine destruction was inevitable.
- The combat radius is 186 miles.
- Without using afterburner; staying at optimum altitude and not maneuvering, the Mig can fly in a straight line for 744 miles.
- The plane was so heavy at 64,200 pounds, that according to early rumors Soviet designers had to eliminate a pilot ejection system. However this was disproved.
- Most MiG-25s used the KM-1 ejector seat. The last versions used an early variant of the famous K-36 seat. The speed record for the fastest successful ejection (Mach 2.67) is held by a KM-1 equipped MiG-25.
- Maximum operational altitude: Carrying two missiles, 78,740 feet (for maximum two minutes duration); carrying four missiles, 68,900 feet is maximum.
- Maximum altitude of missiles: 88,588 feet.
- Ability to intercept an SR-71: Belenko states the Mig-25 cannot intercept the SR-71 for several reasons: The SR-71 fly too high and too fast; the Mig cannot reach it or catch it. The missiles lack the velocity to overtake the SR-71 and in the event of a head on missile fire (The Golden BB), the Guidance system cannot adjust to the high closure rate of the SR-71.
- The Mig-25 has a jam proof radar but cannot distinguish targets below 1,640 feet due to ground clutter. The radar was so powerful it could burn through jamming signals by approaching bombers.
- Maximum G load: With full fuel tanks 2.2 G's is max; with near empty fuel tanks, 5 G's is dangerous. The Mig-25 cannot turn inside a U.S. F-4 Phantom fighter!
- The plane was made of steel alloy, not high temperature titanium, although strips of titanium was used in areas of high heat concentration.
- In a tight turn the missiles could be ripped from the wings.
- The Mig-25 was was not a fighter or an air superiority aircraft but rather designed by the Soviets to climb at tremendous speeds, fire missiles at one pass of the target and then land.
- Search and tracking radar had a range of 55.9 miles.
- The pilot duties were to take off, turn on the auto pilot and await instructions to fire the missiles from ground controllers. The Mig-25 had a superb auto pilot and digital communications from an onboard computer to ground controllers.
- Credit is given to the Soviets for building a high altitude Interceptor in a short period of time with the materials and engines available to them in 1967 in order to counter the perceived threat of the XB-70.
How long it took to figure out that the thing's afterburners were stuck in the full-on position, how long it took to realize it wasn't equipped with adequate targeting or missiles- unknown. While the Mig-31 (1981) was indeed engineered to make a real stand, and this article talks to that, I don't think this article builds a case for or against anyone having any real idea whether the SR-71 (1966) was vulnerable to the Mig-25 or not. If the question is "what repelled the SR71," the question isn't the technical merits of the Mig-31, it's the question of what was known v.s. unknown about what when.
The question of the Mig-25's capabilities were answered more clearly after Viktor Belenko defected with one in 1976. It was not a threat. How long it took to figure that out, and American confidence that Viktor's Mig-25 was as good as any other they'd likely see, remain unknown factors. The Mig-31 (1981) wasn't really much faster, leading to the carefully coordinated chase described in the article, but it at least had an electronics suite, radar, communications link, and armaments capable of making it's threat visibly apparent.
Certainly the Zaslon phased-array radar is impressive and the R-33 missile specs give it the on paper capabilities to hit a SR-71. Yet the article's talks of only two events where an interception occurred, one undated, the second in 1986, after the first major upgrade to the Zaslon radar and the whole time using the very first Soviet in flight digital computer, acquiring targets for a 1970's designed missile the R-33 (fielded 1981).