The purpose of the canary is to provide the issuer with a way of saying "I am no longer trustworthy". Since the canary has not been updated, nothing that can be said in favor of Silent Circle should be trusted. When the canary is again updated, it will be Silent Circle saying "I can be trusted again" (subject to the limitations about coercion as described in the canary message).
For now, do not trust that Silent Circle has not been compromised despite anything you may read in this thread. When the canary is updated, then you may return to the state that you had before: you can speculate that they are being coerced into lying about the canary, or that they are trustworthy. That choice is an has always been yours to make.
I disagree that the state post a future update of the canary is equal to the state before it failed. New canary, same as the old does not apply, the alarm has rung, it can't be 'un-rung'.
The warrant canary is not an alarm that an NSL/etc has been served precisely because NSLs do not allow for any such alarm to be raised. The canary is an assertion that this event has not happened up to a certain date, and so one issued at any point whatsoever is as valid (up to its issue date) as any other.
It's not practical to release new canaries constantly, so there is always an interrim period between one and the next where it is unclear if the situation has changed. A due date/release schedule is a guideline to users for that interrim period. Last canary within one normal scheduled interval? Everything is normal. Last canary longer back? Now we must worry that the situation has changed, because if it hadn't the canary should have been updated.
The release schedule is only that, though, a guideline for deciding during the period since issuance. It changes nothing about the fundamental nature of the canary as a claim up to the specified date. A new canary, early, on time, or late, makes the exact same assertion as each of the older canaries. It being late just prevents user confidence about the state of the service in the time period between 'expiration' and new issuance, the new issuance brings back this confidence.
Releasing a canary late is a sin because it creates a time period in which the state of the service is in question, and frequent/lengthy/otherwise egregious incidents should reduce user trust in a service. That time period ends when a new canary is issued, though, as the protection of the canary is once again in place.
But perhaps I simply misunderstand your ideas. Could you explain what you mean by a means other than analogy (which is honestly not particularly useful here, as the nature of signed text is different than the nature of birds)? Or a better question, if a new canary is issued, but late, then what is the actual scenario that users are not protected against?
That depends on how late 'late' is. A bit late, maybe. Weeks late: indefensible. That leaves room for creative interpretations such as deals being struck and compromised identity.
We need a canary monitor service or something to that effect, I imagine of the alarm wasn't raised here then this situation could have gone on for much longer still. Makes you wonder what the value of the canary is if nobody is actively monitoring it.
We're back on page one. This is exactly what some of us have said hours ago already and others have been doing: they watched the canary "die" (in terms of the mining analogy).
For now, do not trust that Silent Circle has not been compromised despite anything you may read in this thread. When the canary is updated, then you may return to the state that you had before: you can speculate that they are being coerced into lying about the canary, or that they are trustworthy. That choice is an has always been yours to make.