Ah, thanks. Yeah, then it stands to reason that if a canary gets updated, things are fine. As I commented on a sibling, if the USG could compel you to lie, canaries would be completely useless as a concept.

> Yeah, then it stands to reason that if a canary gets updated, things are fine.

I don't think that conclusion is warranted. If the canary gets updated it could be any one of a number of things, one of which is that things are fine. But saying that the canary being updated is the same as you being compelled to lie misses out on a few critical options:

- presumably you set the time interval between updates short enough that your key or passphrase could not be compromised in that timeframe, so any interval longer may indicate a compromised private key

- it's only fine if the canary specs as defined up-front have not been violated (which in this case they have)

- canaries may be useless as a concept anyway because lawyers are human and hence fallible.

(That last one is a stretch, but with stuff like this it's either 1 or 0, not something in between and I don't see an iron clad guarantee there, merely an informed opinion.)